Building Bridges
Experiments with Community Policing in South Asia

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2011
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

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Executive Committee (Ghana): Sam Oukdezo — Chairperson Members: B. G. Verghese, Neville Linton, Akoto Ampaw and Maja Daruwala — Director.


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CHRI London Office
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2nd Floor, South Block, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU
T +44 (0) 207 862 8857
F +44 (0) 207 862 8820
chri@sas.ac.uk

CHRI New Delhi Office
8-117, 1st Floor, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi — 110017, INDIA
T +91 (0) 11 43180200
F +91 (0) 11 26864688
info@humanrightsinitiative.org

CHRI Accra Office
House No. 9, Samora Machel Street, Asylum Down, Opposite Beverly Hills Hotel, Near Trust Towers, Accra, Ghana
T +233 (0) 302 971170
F +233 (0) 302 244819
chrai@humanrightsinitiative.org
www.humanrightsinitiative.org
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Authors
Navaz Kotwal
Sanjay Patil

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CHRI’s police reform programme works towards building knowledge, mobilizing support and catalysing accountability-focused reform across the Commonwealth. We seek to achieve this through increased reporting and documentation of police practices, accountability and police reform processes, through cultivating regional and local networks on police reform and policing issues, and through engaging in research on democratic policing and ways in which it can be adapted across the Commonwealth. In South Asia, our work began in the form of a regional report titled Feudal Forces: Democratic Nations – Police Accountability in Commonwealth South Asia in 2007 that sought to analyse police practices and accountability mechanisms. It was followed up by efforts at deepening police reform debates in individual countries through workshops, research and advocacy while simultaneously continuing to facilitate greater regional awareness and networking.

This report seeks to build upon our work by addressing a theme that is drawing greater interest in debates on police reform but is often poorly understood. The report looks at how community policing is understood across the region, evaluates past and ongoing experiments in Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and India, and makes recommendations for improving its realization.

The report is the culmination of research and efforts of many people both inside and outside CHRI over the past few years.

CHRI would like to thank all the experts who participated in a 5-day online conference organised in July 2010 titled “Building Bridges: The Police and the Public – Experiments with Community Policing in South Asia.” In particular, we are grateful to Mr Richard Miles, Principal Advisor, GIZ, Bangladesh, Mr Jacob Punnoose, former DGP Kerala Police, and Mr Ahmad Chinooy, Chief, CPLC, Karachi for helping us moderate the discussions. Insights shared during the conference have fed into this report at various places. CHRI is grateful to FNF for their support in organising the conference and particularly Ms Katrina Bannich, former project director at FNF New Delhi for her unstinted support.

Additionally, Mr Sanjay Patil travelled to the Maldives, Pakistan and Bangladesh and met with several government representatives, civil society groups and other international organizations/donor agencies involved in community policing experiments. The discussions and meetings held added greatly to our knowledge and understanding of how community policing is viewed in the region. We are grateful to our partners particularly the Maldivian Democracy Network (The Maldives), Bangladesh Legal Aid and Service Trust (BLAST), the Police Reform Programme (UNDP, Bangladesh), Centre for Police and Development Initiative (Pakistan) and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan for their assistance during our field visits.

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Introduction

Policing in Commonwealth South Asia has too often conjured up images of corruption, criminality, abuse of power and a wide gulf between the police and the community that they are expected to serve. The police see themselves primarily as law enforcers rather than law upholders and thus policing focuses on using aggressive tactics to ensure that order is maintained at any cost. This mentality stems from the colonial and feudal mindset that has plagued South Asia for decades and has always placed a premium on control and suppression rather than adhering to democratic models. Ironically, all countries in Commonwealth South Asia profess to be democracies, but do not have policing that reflects such ideals. Instead of having law enforcement that creates an environment of peace and security, and seeks to safeguard the rights of those it is meant to protect, countries in the region have police that are unaccountable, unprofessional and act with impunity.

Democratic policing and what it precisely entails continues to remain a poorly understood concept in the region. Democratic policing is about much more than simply “maintaining law and order”. It is about the police establishing and nurturing a healthy relationship with the community, based on mutual respect and understanding. However, over the years, police forces have digressed from their basic mandate of being service providers to their communities. This deviation has resulted in widening of the trust deficit and a complete lack of respect for the police.

Slowly but gradually, police in the region are beginning to understand that to win the public's respect and carry out their responsibilities they need to shed the culture acquired from the past. There is a gradual shift toward community policing. The concept of community policing has become a key element in the transformation of police forces in the region and the flagship approach to reform. Turning the concept into reality, however, has been a challenge.

If executed properly, community policing exemplifies the ideal manner to guarantee public safety, to collaborate between the protectors (police) and the protected (community) to ensure that law and order is maintained, and the belief that public safety is a priority. Moreover, where community policing has worked, it has proved to be an effective and efficient means to deliver services where resources are limited. This is especially relevant, given the inadequate resources allocated to policing in South Asia. Thus, to move away from the colonial and feudal styles of policing that predominate the region, community policing may provide a feasible solution.

Police across Commonwealth countries, including developed and developing democracies, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Kenya, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the Maldives, have taken on community policing initiatives in some form. Whilst in the more developed nations it is codified as a statutory obligation, in others, it is still in the nascent stages with several teething problems. Nevertheless, community policing is rapidly becoming essential in the effort to improve, streamline and bolster police service delivery and organisational efficiency.

Writing Policing with the Community into the Law
One way of embedding community policing into the organisational culture of the police is by making it a legal obligation under police acts. Several countries,
with relatively newer police acts, have enshrined the practice of community engagement within their texts. Some formulations require that the responsibility of maintaining order and controlling crime is shared by the police and the local community. Others have created local authorities that are responsible for maintaining an efficient and effective local police force.

A major development that has gained ground internationally during the last few decades is the concept of community policing, which has been tried out in different forms. It essentially involves the engagement of community members in providing direction to the police and helps improve police administration and management. It is practised in different ways in different countries. Common to Canada, England and Wales and Northern Ireland is the Board or Commission model that creates mechanisms to bring public input into policing policy. These independent public bodies, comprise political and independent members, whose mandate is chiefly to strengthen accountability by ensuring local-level community participation in policy direction, accountability matters and budgeting. It also involves community input in national and local policing plans and in oversight and/or the appointment of the Head of Police.

For instance, Canada has police forces at the municipal, provincial and federal levels. In addition, several First Nations policing agreements for aboriginal communities are in place across Canada. The role played by the Police Boards or Commissions in governing the police forces, particularly at the municipal level, is significant, as they involve community members who provide direction to the police. For example, in British Columbia, every municipality with a population of 5,000 or more has to provide a police service. Municipalities with their own police forces are required to set up police boards to act as civilian oversight bodies. The Municipal Police Board in British Columbia consists of the Mayor of the Council, one member appointed by the Council and not more than five persons appointed, after consultation with the director, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The Municipal Police Board, in consultation with the Chief Constable, must determine the priorities, goals and objectives of the Municipal Police Department. The charter of the boards or commissions in Canada may differ somewhat across the country, but their mandate is mainly twofold: to provide general direction to the police in accordance with the law and in response to the community needs, and to protect the police from the illegitimate influences of politicians.

In the United Kingdom, a tripartite model of control and accountability is established by the UK Police Act of 1964, and is applicable to all the 43 police forces of England and Wales. As the name indicates, the tripartite system involves three parties in police governance: the Secretary of State, who represents the government, the Police Authority, which stands for the local community and the Chief Constable, who heads the police force. The Police Act, 1964 distributes powers and responsibilities relating to policing between the Secretary of State, the Police Authority and the Chief Constable. The tripartite arrangements were later endorsed by new British legislation, such as the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1994 (PMCA), the Police Act, 1996 and the Police Reform Act, 2002, though the distribution of powers was altered to some extent.

An important party in the UK tripartite system of police governance is the Police Authority. It is an independent body of local people. Generally, it has 17 members—nine local councillors, five independent members and three magistrates from the area. It is responsible for maintaining an efficient and effective local police force. It determines local policing priorities, sets a three-year strategic direction for the police force consistent with the National Policing Plan and monitors police performance against set targets. The Authority is responsible for budgeting and resource allocation to the police. It can appoint and dismiss the chief constable, subject to ratification by the Secretary of State. It can require the suspension or early dismissal of police officers on grounds of public interest.

The Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2003 lays down an express provision for community involvement in policing. Section 31(A) of the Act states: “Police officers shall carry out their functions with the aim - (a) of securing the support of the local community, and (b) of acting in co-operation with the local community.” In addition, the Policing Board of Northern Ireland has set objectives and targets for police performance; monitors trends and patterns in crime and facilitate public-police cooperation to prevent crime; collates public opinion about policing issues through independent opinion surveys, oversees the

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1 British Columbia Police Act, Chapter 367, Section 23 (1).
2 Ibid., Section 26 (4).
working of the internal police complaints and discipline system, holds overall accountability over the Chief Constable (the head of the police), and establishes district policing partnerships to formulate local policing plans.

One of the most successful aspects of the efforts to transform the police in post-apartheid South Africa was the establishment of Community Police Forums (CPF’s). In the South African Police Service (SAPS) Act, 1995, “partnership,” “cooperation” and “communication” were given pre-eminence for the CPF’s in the first three clauses of the section on the functions of CPF’s. According to Section 18 of the South African Police Services Act, the police have a statutory obligation to liaise with the community through community police forums and area and provincial community police boards with a view to: (a) establishing and maintaining a partnership between the community and the Service, (b) promoting communication between the Service and the community, (c) promoting cooperation between the Service and the community in fulfilling the needs of the community regarding policing, (d) improving the rendering of police services to the community at national, provincial, area and local levels; (e) improving transparency in the Service and accountability of the Service to the community; and (f) promoting joint problem identification and problem-solving by the Service and the community.

The Act also required Community Police Boards at the provincial and local area levels which would feed public concerns and safety needs to the police and help shape the policing priorities at the provincial level, which in turn would impact the national policing policy.

In Commonwealth South Asia, community policing has been slow to catch on. In India for instance, strong initiatives exist in specific states. However, there is no national or state policy on the issue. These initiatives were born through the efforts of officers who were inclined towards a community-oriented policing approach. Generally, with the transfer of such officers the initiative would fade away. The Police Act, 1861 is silent on the issue of community consultation. There are no permanent mechanisms or institutions in place to facilitate regular police-community interaction. Most recently however, Kerala was the first state in India to write community policing into its law.\(^3\) In Bangladesh, though not included in police legislation, a strong community policing initiative has begun through the police reform programme supported by UNDP, whereby the goal is to integrate the philosophy of community policing across the police force nationwide. Similarly in the Maldives, community policing was given priority through its Strategic Police Plan. Pakistan, like India, has no real community policing initiative that finds statutory sanction. Initiatives across several provinces exist, but none of these could create the much needed transformation in their police forces.

**Community Policing and South Asia**

If “the police are the public and the public are the police” is meant to reflect the ideal of each regarding the other as an integral resource in securing the safety and well-being of all, then considerable work remains to be done in South Asia. The high level of distrust between the police and the public is due to a number of common problems that plague policing in the region.

There is a culture of impunity for wrongful acts perpetrated by the police. Abuse of power, bias, corruption, illegal methods and excessive use of force, are, even when well documented, left unattended and unpunished. Common abuses include: extrajudicial killings (otherwise known as “encounter deaths”), the widespread use of torture as a method of investigation; illegal and arbitrary arrests, refusal to register First Information Reports, detentions beyond permissible statutory time limits; reluctance to accept complaints or investigate them, and giving false evidence.

Additionally, there is very little effective oversight or review of police conduct. Linked to the issue of impunity, having such mechanisms greatly enhances the likelihood that police will behave lawfully. However, none of the countries in Commonwealth South Asia have what could be described as a transparent and functional external (or internal) accountability mechanism that complies with international good practice. In addition, parliamentary oversight is practically non-existent in the region. Legislatures should constantly be overseeing the effectiveness of policing, but in fact spend little time examining the issue of police performance. Though ad hoc commissions of inquiry or national human rights institutions exist in each South Asian country, they are ineffective in holding the police accountable for malfeasance and in enforcing a change in their methodology.

\(^3\) Section 64 and 65 Kerala Police Act, 2011.
Adding to the problem is the illegitimate political interference in all aspects of police administration. This is a menace endemic throughout the region. It is not uncommon for transfers, promotions and issues of tenure to be dictated by considerations other than fairness or merit. Consequently, the treatment of law and order problems and the pace of crime investigation is often coloured by this issue. Political interference is one of the most pervasive and insidious problems that undermine the professionalism of police personnel throughout South Asia. The situation makes it incredibly difficult for diligent and honest officers to maintain their integrity and expect to also advance their careers.

A serious lack of resources is a significant barrier to good policing. Despite increasing budgetary allocations, financial resources for law enforcement are poorly deployed and managed. As a result, police officers at the thana (police station) are often deprived of the basic necessities required to perform their jobs with any level of efficacy. For example, public complaints cannot be written because paper is frequently out of stock and if a vehicle is available for use, then it has no petrol. Moreover, irrational provisioning results in surreal situations where hardware is provided (computers, mobile phones, radio sets or forensic equipment), but essential peripherals, maintenance contracts, or training for use are absent.

Finally, the conditions and conditioning of the constabulary are unconscionably bad. In addition to the fact that recruitment is often marred by bribery and influence peddling, the officers ultimately employed often fail to reflect the demographic composition of the community being policed. Further, police to population ratios are well below international norms because many sanctioned positions remain vacant. Further, it is not uncommon for police personnel to work 24-hour shifts without a rest day or live in sub-standard barracks. Non-existent or deficient training in investigative techniques and crime scene examination exacerbate these inadequate conditions of the constabulary. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the police are surly, discontented and unmotivated. The consequent public alienation further isolates the police and continues a vicious cycle of mutual distrust that only gets worse with each passing year.

Community policing alone will of course not solve all policing problems described above. Some of the ailments relate to systemic problems of governance that are outside the province of either the police or the public. However, community policing is about doing more with less. Specifically, with its approach of policing by consent and not coercion, and with the police as a part of the community and not apart from it, community policing offers an opportunity to repair the seriously damaged relationship between the public and the police.

In the context of the widespread distrust between the community and police personnel, policing at the basic level of the police station can provide a setting for representatives of community and police to “find each other” and resolve some of their mutual mistrusts. Its establishment would send out a powerful signal that police would henceforward need to work in a manner that involved acknowledgement of community perceptions and take on board the concerns of community members.

With trust at an all-time low, and with the gap between the public and the police ever greater, it is imperative for the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and the health of the community that a bridge is built between these alienated camps. If undertaken properly, community policing can be that bridge.

**Objective of this Report**

The vicious cycle of mutual distrust between the police and the public has fuelled a region-wide interest in community policing. This report will explore how community policing is treated in South Asia to date and the opportunities that are available for improvement. Chapter 2 will seek to capture a brief history of community policing, and the guiding factors and the fundamental principles on which community policing is based. Chapters 3 to 6 will examine attempts to introduce community policing in Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, and Pakistan, respectively, and assess to what extent they have been successful. Although some jurisdictions may have more than one experience with community policing, this report will focus primarily on the best resourced and most sophisticated experiment in a country and provide only a summary of other attempts. All chapters will conclude with recommendations on how the profiled experiment with community policing can be improved so that it complies with the principles outlined in this report.
The Concept of Community Policing

Origins of Community Policing

While establishing the London Metropolitan Police in the 1800s Sir Robert Peel laid out several principles on which to base policing. One of these can be regarded as the seed of community policing: “The police are the public and the public are the police.” This principle was the central organising concept of the police service. It can be said that “community policing” emanated from this philosophical approach. However, for various reasons, this principle of policing was gradually forgotten and with the advent and move toward greater professionalisation of the service, the separation of the police from the community was complete. To curb corruption, transfers within the service were frequent and all control and management rested at a central position to ensure that there was scrupulous compliance with the law.

As this philosophy prevailed, the police soon had trouble communicating with all the members of the communities they served. The alienation was complete and in some communities an attitude of “us versus them” prevails. In the 1960s and 70s the divide grew further. Social movements were generating anti-war protesters, civil rights activists and other groups that began to demonstrate. Having lost the pulse of the people the police were unprepared to deal with the situation.

The hostility that had developed toward the police, forced its leadership to take stock of the situation. Additionally, the police force’s inability to handle the unrest in an effective and appropriate manner brought demands by civic leaders and politicians for a re-examination of police practices. Several Commissions were set up between 1968 and 1973 that made a number of recommendations for changes in policing.

In the US, police departments and external agencies conducted extensive research that finally led the police to re-evaluate traditional policing methods. Several significant research studies during the 1970s provided noteworthy findings and equally important recommendations. The role of the foot patrol versus patrol cars was discussed and evaluated in detail, as was the relationship between field interrogations of suspicious persons and criminal deterrence. What followed was a community-oriented policing (COP) project, which was the first empirical study of community policing.

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5 Although this publication uses the term “community policing”, others use the term “community-oriented policing”, “community-based policing”, or “partnership policing” when describing police-public collaboration.


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The COP project laid great stress on patrol officers. These officers were required to gather knowledge about their beats and be familiar with the area geographies and the communities that resided there. Each beat was expected to have a specific personalised strategy to address crime and citizen concerns.

Officers participating in the COP project concluded that random patrolling was not as important as earlier thought. They also concluded that developing stronger ties with members of the community was more important than once believed. In addition, they realised that interaction with the community could improve officers’ attitudes towards their jobs and the communities they served and could encourage them to develop creative solutions to complex problems.

Several findings of this study have a direct bearing on present-day community policing efforts. First, by getting to know members of the community, the officers were able to obtain valuable information about criminal activities and perpetrators. They were also able to obtain realistic assessments of the needs of community members and their expectations of police services.

Many of the strategies that evolved from this research are now considered essential to improve performance. Ideas that were raised four decades ago are now being modified and expanded to fit current conditions. Police leaderships across the world realise that it is no longer sufficient to think in terms of making minor alterations to traditional management and operational practices.

Although a precise definition of community policing does not exist, it is generally acknowledged that community policing is an agency-specific philosophy and a management approach aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime and greater sense of safety amongst communities; improved police service, and greater legitimacy of the police through a proactive dependence on community resources.

The philosophy is built on the idea that the public deserves an input into policing and has a right to it. It also rests on the view that to find solutions to community problems, the police and the public must move beyond a narrow focus on individual crimes or incidents, and instead consider innovative ways of addressing community concerns.

At the heart of community-based policing is the recognition that policing is a service, and the police’s role is much more than merely fighting crime. The aspiration of any community policing initiative is the creation of a specialised, representative, approachable and accountable institution that works together with the community at large.

Though individual community-oriented policing initiatives may adopt varied strategies depending on the responses and needs of their communities, certain basic principles are common to all community policing efforts. Some of these fundamental features are:

a. Practise policing by consent, not coercion.

b. Be a part of the community, not apart from it.

c. Find out (together with the community) what the community’s needs are.

d. Work in partnership with other agencies and the public.

e. Tailor the “business” of policing to meet the community’s needs.

f. Be accountable for its service.

However, how these characteristics can be achieved is the real challenge. It is critically important that law enforcement agencies understand that rubber-stamping the implementation of community policing

What is Community Policing?
The term community policing is paradoxical in nature, for policing ideally is about communities. Hence while the implementation of schemes that build bridges between the two are viewed as efforts at community policing, these are only additional measures adopted to ensure good policing. The umbrella term espouses more than just community interaction — it targets organisational restructuring and problem solving as well. The desired outcome thus stems beyond the introduction of temporary isolated projects attempting to provide more effective policing, to structurally reorganising the traditional model to better satisfy its role as a provider of good policing.

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*Police Reform Through Community Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation,* pp6

*ibid.,* pp.4
does not necessarily address the policing challenges confronting a particular community. There is no ironclad, precise definition of community policing, nor a set of specific activities that must always be included. A set of universally applicable principles and elements can be identified, but exactly how they are implemented should and must vary from place to place, because jurisdictions and police agencies have differing needs and circumstances." (emphasis added). 10

This point cannot be stressed enough. For community policing to be successful, police authorities must, in consultation with civil society, elected leaders and other stakeholders, formulate an approach that takes into account the contextual reality of the community they are policing. A failure to do so, irrespective of how many resources are allocated, will doom the effort, since it will not be tailored to the community’s needs.

The implementation of community policing requires a fundamental shift in the structure and administration of police organisations. While crime control and prevention remain the core concerns, community policing tactics use a variety of means to address these goals. The police and the community become partners in addressing problems of crime and disorder. As links between the two are reinforced over time, the resulting partnership will be better able to identify and alleviate the basic causes of crime.

Implementation of Community Policing Initiatives

Two major changes must occur within the police organisation if community policing is to work efficiently. Strong partnerships and concerted efforts must first be established with the community. The command structure of the police organisation must then be decentralised so that problem solving, decision-making, and accountability are spread over all levels of the organisation. Such a decentralisation, challenges personnel to be more creative and effective, because the decisions they make are timely and influenced by first-hand knowledge of the facts.

1. Organisational Changes

Implementation of community policing is greatly affected by the organisational structure put in place.

Given that successful community policing demands a different approach from traditional policing, significant modifications in organisational structure will inevitably have to be made. If done properly, this will assist in the development of philosophy, strategy and tactics. 11 Specifically, agency transformation requires that power be pushed downward in policing organisations:

Community policing requires the shifting of initiative, decision-making and responsibility downward within the police organisation... Under community policing, patrol officers are given broader freedom to decide what should be done and how it should be done in their communities—they assume managerial responsibility for the delivery of police services to their assigned areas. Patrol officers are the most familiar with the needs and strengths of their communities and are thus in the best position to forge the close ties with the community that lead to effective solutions to local problems. 12

This type of organisational modification will be quite a challenge in South Asia where hierarchical structures rule the day. Despite this challenge, there is potential in South Asia to institute the necessary organisational changes that would permit community policing to succeed.

* Assess the Police Organisation

Before embarking on a quest to incorporate community policing into everyday policing, the police leadership needs to understand both the strengths and weaknesses of its organisation. This may include mapping the structures, resources and mandates of the organisation and its relations with political institutions.

* Shift of Power

Since community policing works best when the community has a direct and trustworthy relationship with a local police officer, for the relationship to flourish that police officer needs to be empowered and given ample discretion to adequately respond to the community’s concerns. They should have greater powers to make decisions in non-law enforcement situations.

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and should not have to constantly request approval from their seniors in order to proceed on a particular matter.

With this additional responsibility, the supervision from senior officers should be more regular with interactions between all levels. This will make policing far more efficient and boost the performance of individual officers who are expected to do more in a position of trust.

- **Increased Transparency**
  Community policing involves decision-making processes that are more open and transparent. If the community is to be a full partner, the department needs mechanisms for readily sharing relevant information on crime and disorder problems and police operations with the community.

- **Deployment**
  Police deployment needs to be given high priority with greater infusion of personnel in crime-prone areas as well as where the community density is high. This will ensure that policing is proactive and preventive and based on community needs. Long-term crime prevention strategies should be planned along with deployment planning.

Another important facet of deployment is the need for guaranteed long-term tenures for officers. No community policing will be effective unless police officers assigned to community policing are permitted to stay in that role for an extended period of time. For community policing to work, the community needs to be able to forge a deep and lasting relationship with specific police officers. This will enable the community and the police to develop trust, confidence and cooperation with each other.

- **Recruitment**
  Recruitment of police should stress on higher educational levels. A shift in recruitment policy will gradually change the present image of the police. Additionally, police organisations need to hire officers with characteristics well suited to community policing. These officers must be conscientious, emotionally stable, amicable, service-oriented and have practical intelligence.

- **Training and Capacity Building**
  Focus on police training is presently based on the physical and outdoor aspects. The junior ranks of the constabulary throughout are often poorly trained and not taught how to interact respectfully and professionally with the citizenry. For community policing to succeed, a reorientation in training is required. Stress should be laid on interpersonal skills and becoming more community-oriented. Officers should be trained to identify and correct conditions that lead to crime, raise public awareness and engage with the community in finding solutions to problems. Field training officers and supervisors need to learn how to encourage problem-solving and help officers learn from other problem-solving initiatives. Additionally, the performance evaluation of officers should take into account their community-oriented activities and due acknowledgement and recognition should be given to such efforts.

- **Creation of Reliable Accountability Structures**
  Part of the distrust between the public and the police is because the police are rarely, if ever, held accountable for egregious wrongdoing. If the public and the police are to truly have positive interaction in the context of community policing, then the public must be convinced that an errant officer will be held accountable if he/she does something that is illegal or unethical. This can take the form of an effective complaints procedure and/or a functioning internal review board.

2. **Changing Relationship with the Community**

- **Conduct a Baseline Survey**
  As part of the effort to genuinely incorporate the community’s concerns into the delivery of services, the police organisation must know what the community comprises and its attitude to the police. Therefore, an initial baseline survey of perceptions of and on policing is critical for ultimately assessing the relative success of any initiative. This data can later be used to review if the citizens are any happier with the police after the implementation of community policing.

- **Community Involvement**
  Citizen input and participation is crucial in community policing. This means two things. First, the police must engage with the community. When putting a plan for community policing in place, the police must clearly establish that constant dialogue and interaction with the community serves as the bedrock of the community.
policing initiative. Second, if the community policing project is to be successful, the police must decide at the outset that they will be responsive to community concerns. If the community identifies issues of concern that differ from police priorities, the police must be willing to rethink or adjust their approach to accommodate the sentiments expressed by the community. A failure to do either of these two things removes the "community" from community policing and ensures that there will be little or no community ownership over the project.

- **Ensure the Solicitation of Community Ideas**
  Typically, the police in South Asia very rarely seek the opinion of community members on how to deliver policing services. However, for community policing to work, they must actively solicit ideas from the public on these matters. This can be done through formal fortnightly or monthly meetings, or informally on an ongoing basis. The key is that both the public and the police should be equal partners in crafting solutions to the problems of public safety. And depending on the level of initial participation, the police may have to be more proactive in engaging the community.

- **Provide the Community and the Police with an Outlet to Raise Concerns**
  When the public or police wish to raise a concern, they ought to be provided with the opportunity to do so either formally (community meetings) or informally (one-on-one conversations). Having such forums available will relieve potential tension and is a productive way to exchange ideas.

- **Crime Mapping**
  There must be a better mapping of crime as well as profiling community populations, networks, needs and available resources. This prior knowledge, that is frequently updated, will go a long way in any successful community policing initiative.

### 3. Challenges to Community Policing

When community policing is performed well, addressing crime becomes preventive and proactive. Police officers are positioned closer to information sources and receive early warnings of potential flare-ups in the community, thus responding to problems before they escalate into more serious incidents. They also establish relationships that create trust in the community, ensuring that community members are more likely to come forward when a crime has occurred. This is especially true in communities that have a long-standing fear and mistrust of the police and is perhaps the most powerful advantage of community policing.

- **Lack of Clear Policies Regarding Community Policing**
  The greatest barrier to community policing lies in its implementation phase. A wide gap between the police and public can result in the failure of the police to introduce community policing. These challenges are not easy to overcome and will require considerable patience and resolve on the part of both the police and the community.

  Second, communities in South Asia are very rarely homogeneous and therefore may not have a shared vision on what community policing should appear to be in a particular neighbourhood. While diversity of opinion is normally a good thing, it may prove to be a barrier in coalescing a unified strategy on how to improve the delivery of policing services.

  Similarly, policing culture and attitudes in South Asia pose a significant obstacle. It is not unusual for the police to treat the public with disregard. As a result, overcoming decades, if not centuries, of entrenched feudal attitudes exhibited by the police will be difficult.

- **Lack of Funds and Resources**
  Sustaining community involvement and engagement is not simple. Funds available for policing and police force budgets are extremely modest. Unless additional funds are made available for community policing the initiative is likely to fail. Carving out the necessary resources for community policing may be a significant challenge. While in theory community policing should not require a substantial injection of funds, since it is primarily about re-orienting existing resources allocated for traditional policing, the fact is that the lower ranks of the constabulary in South Asia are simply ill-trained and poorly equipped (materially and skill-wise) to do the type of proactive policing required under community policing. Therefore, funds must be found for the capacity building and training required to enhance the competency of junior police personnel to work effectively in a community policing paradigm.

### Potential Pitfalls

Comparing community policing with merely beat
policing/patrol has its own risks. While officers on foot have the statistical chance of coming closer to the community and meeting more people, it is important that attention is paid to community needs and dynamics.

Any successful community policing experiment will see a rise in the recording of crime. This is reasonable to expect. Firstly, sensitising community members may make them more aware of crime, and secondly, with the building of trust and forging of ties between police and community, citizens are more likely to report crime than previously. Therefore, it may be very rash to expect a reduction of crime in the early phases of any community policing initiative. Even when crime is “eventually” reduced, police should be most cautious about taking credit for it because they will be held accountable when crime figures go up. Community policing needs to function for the long term, it must have a thorough plan and the police and community ought to be fully involved in it.

**Evaluating Success**

A vital aspect of implementation of community policing initiatives is its assessment. Assessment becomes even more critical when an organisation is undergoing comprehensive changes that a shift to community policing entails. Such an assessment should consider progress in the achievement of necessary change within the police organisation itself and with the accomplishment of establishing working relationships with the community.

Developing a sound assessment programme should begin with a strategic plan that outlines the goals, methods, objectives and timelines. These goals and responsibilities will form the basis of performance assessment and will permit the police leadership to detect failures and roadblocks, as well as to chart the progress and document successes.

As police take a proactive role in deterring crime, a broader set of assessment criteria, which incorporate traditional measures of crime-fighting activities with those that encompass community partnerships and problem solving activities, will be needed.

**Indicators for Evaluation**

Several indications of the success of community policing efforts such as the absence of fear, the quality of interaction with community members are intangible. Therefore, assessing a community policing strategy is a qualitative as well as a quantitative process.

Though these may vary, some basic indicators for the evaluation of community policing initiatives could be:

- The level of physical security enjoyed by citizens
- The ratio of reported to unreported crime
- The reduction in crime rates
- The community’s perception regarding the safety of their persons and property
- The protection of victim rights
- The protection of the rights of the accused.

Assessment of community policing is an ongoing process that should include a re-evaluation of the assessment measures themselves. With greater experience in community policing, a police agency can develop measures that accurately chart successes and failures and indicate where changes need to be made.

**Misconceptions about Community Policing**

Community policing calls for long-term commitment; it is not a quick fix. Police agencies should not allow political leaders and the public to develop unrealistic expectations for community policing in terms of crime deterrence or the speed of implementation. Achieving ongoing partnerships with the community and eradicating the underlying causes of crime involves planning, flexibility, time and patience.

Owing to the misconceptions that people in South Asia have about what “community policing” precisely means, it is important to dispel what it is not. Community policing is not policing by the community. One should not confuse the “police are the public and the public are the police” as a call to the community to actually perform policing duties. The reason our societies have designated police officers secure public safety is because it is recognised that it requires professional training and a unique skill set and a lay community member is not equipped to perform policing functions.

Community policing also does not imply that the police are no longer in authority or that the primary duty of preserving law and order is subordinated. However,
tapping into the expertise and resources that exist within communities relieves the police of some of their burdens.

Salwa Judum is an anti-Naxalite movement in Chhattisgarh, India, which started in 2005 as a resistance movement against the Naxalites (a far-left movement in some states of rural India that is designated by the Central Government as a terrorist organisation on account of their violent illegal activities). The Chhattisgarh government created “Special Police Officers” (SPOs) from Salwa Judum to combat the Naxal threat. SPOs are statutorily created under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007, and are also permitted under Section 17 of the India Police Act, 1861. Credible reports indicate that the Salwa Judum and SPOs are involved in significant human rights abuses. Although the Supreme Court of India refused to interfere with the Chhattisgarh government’s ability to appoint SPOs, the Bench’s ruling did not hold that SPOs have not been involved in questionable conduct. Notwithstanding arguments surrounding the legality of SPOs, the fact that they have been implicated in gross misconduct is reason enough, prima facie, to reject such initiatives in the context of community policing. Community policing relies on a peaceful collaboration between police and the public and not the creation of state-sanctioned militia.

Furthermore, community policing should not be contingent on the whim or initiative of a particular Superintendent of Police. This ad hoc approach to community policing is doomed to failure, since it is highly unlikely that his/her successor will follow up with the issue in exactly the same way. Assuming that the successor is even interested in continuing community policing, the truth is that a failure to institutionalise the practice makes it very difficult for the approach to be sustainable in the long term.

Finally, there are some circumstances under which it is difficult if not impossible to undertake community policing. If there is a lack of basic security, particularly in areas that are battling insurgents or terrorists, it is not possible for the police and the community to come together to initiate an open and free exchange of ideas on securing public safety, since the spectre of significant and intense violence constantly looms over them. A certain physical and psychological space is required for a collaborative approach to policing to be properly embodied. The absence of such space usually means that when “community policing” is discussed in conflict-ridden areas, the discourse normally revolves around the creation of Salwa Judum-like vigilante groups.

12 Section 17 of the India Police Act, 1861, reads: “When it shall appear that any unlawful assembly, or riot or disturbance of the peace has taken place, or may be reasonably apprehended, and that the police-force ordinarily employed for preserving the peace is not sufficient for its preservation and for the protection of the inhabitants and the security of property in the place where such unlawful assembly or riot or disturbance of the peace has occurred, or is apprehended, it shall be lawful for any police-officer not below the rank of Inspector to apply to the nearest Magistrate to appoint so many of the resident of the neighbourhood as such police-officers may require to act as special police-officers for such time and within such limits as he shall deem necessary, and the Magistrate to whom such application is made shall, unless he see cause to the contrary, comply with the application.”
17 “Chhattisgarh’s power to appoint special cops stays”, IANS (18 February 2010) at http://www.thainian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/ chattisgarh%27s-power-to-appoint-special-cops-stays_180322502.html (last accessed on 18 November 2010).
3.1 Background

With Bangladesh being a unitary state, law enforcement is a centralised function whereby the Bangladesh police is mainly responsible for the delivery of policing services across the country. However, like most police organisations throughout South Asia, the performance record of the Bangladesh police historically, has not been very good.

Although several committees and commissions have investigated the problems associated with policing in Bangladesh, none of those efforts resulted in substantive reform. In 2003, the first serious police reform initiative in Bangladesh was initiated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP Bangladesh Country Office engaged with key stakeholders in critical discussions and negotiations at formal and informal levels. The participants included members of both the security and criminal justice sectors in Bangladesh, mainly the police. UNDP put together a Needs Assessment Report wherein they concluded that "an accountable, transparent and efficient policing service in Bangladesh is essential for the safety and well-being of all citizens, national stability and longer-term growth and development, particularly the creation of a secure environment which is conducive to consumer and investor confidence." 19

Based on this assessment, the Police Reform Programme (PRP) was created. With funding from UNDP, the European Community and the UK Department for International Development, Phase I of the PRP commenced in January 2005 and ended in September 2009. Its objective is "to develop a safer and more secure environment based on respect for human rights and equitable access to justice through police reform, which is more responsive to the needs of poor and vulnerable people including women." 20 By working in conjunction with the Bangladesh police, the PRP seeks to professionalise the service by improving its efficiency and effectiveness in several key areas:

- Crime prevention
- Investigations, operations and prosecutions
- Human resource management and training
- Strategy and oversight
- Programme management
- Communication
- Trafficking in human beings. 21

As crime prevention is such a central element to the PRP's approach, community policing has assumed increasingly greater importance in Bangladesh. During Phase I, two key documents were produced by the PRP: Community Policing: National Strategy for Bangladesh and Community Policing - Service Manual. Building on these baseline documents, Phase II of the PRP (that commenced in October 2009 and will end in September 2014) focuses more on community policing and how current projects underway can be improved.

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However, notwithstanding recent PRP initiatives and an attempt in 1992 to establish “neighbourhood watch” programmes in Mymensingh town and parts of Dhaka, community policing in Bangladesh first began in earnest in 2004. The Asia Foundation (TAF) supported efforts to initiate community policing in selected districts. TAF staff conducted a fact-finding study whereby they interviewed people on their impressions of the police. Second, a baseline survey was conducted to examine community-police relations. Third, a pilot project was initiated in Bogra, Jessore and Mymensingh districts to improve the dynamic between the police and the community by forming Community Policing Forums (CPF).\(^{22}\)

The objective was for the CPF to serve as a focal point to design a programme for greater, healthier public-police interaction and cooperation. The CPFs typically included 20-25 people from the community who belonged to a wide cross-section of professions including school teachers, local business people, religious leaders, NGO representatives and farmers. TAF’s project continued for over four years, during which several assessments were conducted. These verified that the community policing projects supported by it, specifically the work done by the NGO, Lighthouse, in Bogra, were effective in bridging the communication gap that is customary to public-police relations in Bangladesh.\(^{24}\)

Although TAF shifted its support to other projects in 2008, the community policing work was largely taken over by the Netherlands Embassy in 2009 and implemented by GTZ. This GTZ-implemented work is part of a larger Gender-Responsive Community Based Policing project that GTZ is doing in collaboration with the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MWCA). Project interventions include: \(^{25}\)

- Installing gender-responsive community policing strategies and systems
- Enhancing capacity of communities and the police to implement gender-responsive community-based policing
- Establishing effective communication strategies
- Establishing links between various existing programmes and approaches related to gender-responsive community-based policing.

It is interesting to note the intersection between the work implemented by GTZ in Bogra and elsewhere, and the PRP-sponsored community policing projects throughout the rest of Bangladesh. The Gender-Responsive Community-Based Policing component under MWCA implemented the Promotion of Legal and Social Empowerment of Women (PLSEW)\(^{26}\) project which endeavours to prevent crimes against women through problem identification and solution. The proposed initiative is designed to support ongoing community policing initiatives of the Bangladesh Police by working through communities and ensuring gender responsiveness.

As part of the PLSEW, GTZ and International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) organised an International Conference on Gender, International Human Rights Law and Community Based Policing. This conference took place on 3-4 March 2010 in Dhaka and included police, government officials, civil society and NGOs from across South Asia. With an emphasis on gender-responsive community-based policing, the conference identified concrete recommendations on how to improve the functioning of CPF’s generally, and specifically, in Bangladesh. Some of these valuable recommendations are repeated at the end of this chapter.

Another example of the intersection between NGOs and the Bangladesh police’s efforts to formalise community policing is with the initiation of CPF’s by the PRP’s during Phase I of their programming work; the selected structure essentially replicated the configuration of the TAF model. However, the initial efforts of the Bangladesh Police were deeply flawed because not enough attention was paid to: \(^{26}\)


\(^{26}\) The Royal Netherlands Embassy is providing 2.4 million Euros to the PLSEW.
given to monitoring the creation and ongoing work of every CPF. The rapid expansion of CPFs reflected a lack of diligent individual oversight by the police leadership while they were being set up and during their initial functioning. "Over 20,000 CPFs were hastily established, often without police officers and their communities having clear understanding of the objectives. Moreover CPFs were rolled out before the ministry approved the National Community Policing Strategy drafted by UNDP and the police, creating what one parliamentarian described as 20,000 rudderless ships." \(^1\)

Given the cross-over between NGO initiatives and the PRP's formal programming, it is useful to look at both efforts together as one case study, and assess overall, how community policing is approached in Bangladesh, since both models for community policing are oriented around the CPF.

3.2 Case Study: Community Policing and CPFs in Bangladesh

3.2.1 NGO Initiatives – Lighthouse (Bogra)

Lighthouse is an NGO headquartered in Bogra, focusing on human rights, and was involved in TAF's initial community policing project. As part of its work under the programme, Lighthouse established 22 CPFs in its pilot area. It worked with the police, community and local elites to improve the local law and order situation and raise awareness on issues of good governance, human rights, social justice and alternative dispute resolution. \(^2\) An integral element of this particular initiative was its emphasis on alternative dispute resolution.

With the end of TAF's support for that particular programme, Lighthouse, along with three other NGOs participated in the Gender-Responsive Community-Based Policing project implemented by GTZ. This project did not seek to create new CPFs. Rather, its aim was to help build the capacity of existing CPFs. This was done by Lighthouse field workers serving as a liaison between the police and the CPF and ensuring that CPFs had a one-third representation of women.

Bogra is a district town situated in the north-west of Bangladesh. Oppression of women is high with violence against women a major problem. Alternate dispute resolution or mediation is taken care of by the local elite. However, no woman ever finds a position on these mediation centres. As a result, resolutions of such disputes are frequently settled on the basis of prevailing attitudes that work against women's interests.

The Community Policing Committees (CPCs) formed under the police's initiatives lack any representation by women. Additionally, a large number of the community policing committees are not functioning. Members of these committees remained unaware of their roles and functions. The involvement of the police in programme activities was not encouraging and their responsiveness was weak. To address this problem, Lighthouse, in partnership with GTZ, sought to implement a project that would activate the dormant CPCs, enhance the capacity of existing CPC members and make these CPCs more gender-sensitive, while at the same time, increase women's representation on these committees.

Lighthouse field workers acted as a liaison between the police and the CPF, to ensure the proper and non-politicised functioning of the CPF and to see that the CPF and the Bangladesh police properly and adequately addressed gender-related issues. Lighthouse is performing this service in 60 ward CPFs. Some of these were initiated by Lighthouse during the TAF programme, and some by the Bangladesh police. A survey conducted by Lighthouse on the 60 ward CPFs initiated by the Bangladesh police revealed that women comprised only 4.78 per cent of the members (45 of 942). \(^3\) Subsequent to a joint Lighthouse-Bangladesh police engineered reorganisation, the number of women in the surveyed 60 CPFs increased to 28.7 per cent (270 of 942).

During a visit to ward No. 1 in Bogra an opportunity was afforded to interact with the Lighthouse-assisted CPF of that ward. The CPF has 34 members, of which 29 were men and five women. Meetings were conducted once a month, sometimes twice if circumstances demanded, and were attended by people from all walks of life. The


\(^2\) Lighthouse Brochure on the organisational background of Lighthouse.

\(^3\) "Report on Gender Responsive Community Based Policing", Lighthouse, January 2010.
Sub-Inspector (SI) is expected to attend the meetings, while the Lighthouse field worker coordinates them and serves as the liaison between the CPF and the police.

The ward councillor is the convenor of the CPF and is thus informed of any impending transfer of key police personnel. In a Lighthouse-initiated CPF, the ward councillor is always the councillor or commissioner of the Ward. In a Bangladesh Police-initiated CPF, sometimes it is the councillor but is often a local person who is selected. Regardless, the lack of homogeneity among the different CPFs poses a cause for concern. There should be some consistency in the manner in which CPFs are structured and administered.

The introduction of CPFs in Bogra produced some positive outcomes. For instance, CPF members generally believe that police responsiveness to the community has improved. Moreover, there is greater willingness amongst citizens to approach senior police officials. This is apparent during the Open House days, organised by the Bangladesh police, where the populace is eager to engage with officials. In survey assessments conducted by Lighthouse in 2008, it was found that nearly 100 per cent of all respondents interviewed thought that the law and order situation had improved as a result of community policing. Additionally, they believe that the community policing initiative helped reduce drug abuse, oppression against women and unsocial activities in the locality.\(^\text{31}\)

However, while community policing efforts may have earlier helped maintain law and order in the district, current interviews suggest that those advances may be subject to a rollback. For instance, it is widely believed that politics plays an oversize role in Bangladesh police-initiated CPFs operations, and politicians are again influencing police in a manner that is not concerned with law and order.\(^\text{32}\) In addition, notwithstanding nascent attempts to improve the relationship with the community, long-standing issues of corruption and failure to register FIRs still affect police functioning.

It is interesting to note that CPF members openly stated that even if the Bangladesh police were to perform 20-30 per cent of what they had promised towards improving policing, the CPF membership would be fairly satisfied. This reflects the incredibly low expectations that people have of the police. But herein lies an opportunity for the police organisation. Since the bar is so low, it is not impossible or unrealistic for the police to improve their image with the public. If they do manage to meet this low bar, they would earn enough goodwill which could translate into greater trust. This type of confidence building is a cycle that can lead to better policing and improved public-police relations. For this to happen though, there has to be genuine commitment to community policing and not merely mediocre attempts that are more focused on public relations than on actual reform.

### 3.2.2 Police Reform Programme

In Phase I of its programme, the PRP identified community policing as an important component in its attempt to reform the Bangladesh police. Hence, in August 2008, it drafted a document, *Community Policing: National Strategy for Bangladesh*. This document relies considerably on the input and recommendations made by participants at a series of divisional community consultations held from September 2007 to June 2008. The National Community Policing Strategy lays out quite coherently the different factors that must be considered when embarking on a quest to implement effective and appropriate community policing in Bangladesh. For instance, it correctly points out that there is much more to community policing than simply setting up a Community Policing Forum.\(^\text{33}\) Unfortunately, when first implementing community policing, the Bangladesh police often viewed the creation of the CPF as an end in and of itself; they failed to recognise that the utility of the CPF resides in how it is used and not merely because it exists.

The National Community Policing Strategy drafted by the PRP is a very good template for police organisations to consider, while formulating their respective frameworks of planning and strategy for community policing. The “Assessment” section of this chapter elucidates the strength of this strategic document in greater detail.

The problem with community policing during PRP’s Phase I was not the theoretical approach that was

\(^{30}\) According to the Ward Councillor in Ward No. 1, a Station House Officer (SHO) usually lasts approximately two years. If the SHO is not good, then he may be gone in 3-6 months.


\(^{32}\) Interview with CPF members in Bogra, 6 March 2010.

adopted. Rather, the Bangladesh police’s attempts to implement community policing encountered significant difficulties because of a failure to corral the necessary political will to ensure that partisan interests did not compromise the effort.

As a result, during Phase II the PRP faces the difficult task of remediating the defects of community policing in Bangladesh (as established in Phase I). The following is an excerpt from a report of the International Crisis Group in December 2009. It accurately describes the politicisation of CPFs that adversely affected initial efforts to establish community policing in Bangladesh:

A number of CPFs around Bangladesh have been problematic. In some cases, the forums have created a new layer of small-time elite between the police and the public along with the potential for abuse and corruption. Police officers have sold CPF memberships to the highest bidder while CPF chairs have sold vacancies. Political party affiliation can also determine membership in CPFs. The chairperson of a Chittagong CPF explained: “Community police forums have become politicised and become another forum for ruling parties to abuse the opposition. They have used the CPF to file false complaints against opponents.” Without improving—and introducing in some cases—vetting mechanisms, PRP officials worry that most of the 20,000 CPFs could become co-opted by local politicians, especially by new MPs. A senior police official described a meeting with a current government minister who chastised him for assisting with CPFs under the CTG. The minister claimed that elected officials must constitute CPF forums, not the police. The officer asked, “If we can’t even operate these independently, how can police serve the people?”

Aside from the intense politicisation of CPFs during Phase I of the PRP, a significant flaw in the Bangladesh police’s approach to community policing is reflected in the statement of a Rajshahi officer: “To do community policing right, you need at least one officer devoted to it full time.” Community policing is still viewed by some, if not many, Bangladesh police officers as an adjunct to “normal” policing. It does not appear that any reorientation of policing has taken place whereby community policing is viewed as everyday policing. To a certain extent, this shift in mentality has occurred at the Model Thanas, but it has not seeped into the broader institutional culture of the Bangladesh police.

Model Thanas

Model Thanas (MTs) are established in metropolitan and rural areas to demonstrate how community policing can benefit the community and ensure that their needs and expectation are met. Eleven MTs were completed and operational during Phase I and six more were in the process of construction. During Phase II, it is expected that an additional 18 thanas, two in each Division and one in each Metropolitan area, will be refurbished and other support provided to establish them as model police stations. These MTs are dedicated to deliver pro-people policing service in their engagements with the local community. Such a public-police consultation is a process to assist Bangladesh Police in their engagements with the community on matters such as crime prevention and safety. The operational costs of the Model Thana initiatives will be borne by the Bangladesh police. PRP will monitor their sustainability as part of the sustainability framework between the Bangladesh police and PRP.

The MT in Uttara is an example. The thana was inaugurated as “model” on 7 June 2007 and has one inspector, twenty sub-inspectors, twenty-eight assistant sub-inspectors and sixty-two constables. The police personnel at Uttara receive training from the PRP on service delivery and investigative techniques.

MTs are provided with substantially better hardware than other thanas. They have more motorcycles for patrolling, fax machines that obviate the need to attend court merely to deliver required documents and radio handsets for more efficient communication. In addition, there is a separate area in the station house for intake of complaints and inquiries. Another feature of the MT is that it holds Open House Day once a month. Its objective is to have a more transparent police operation and to further accelerate the efforts of community-based policing. "On this day people talk directly with the police about their problems in the community. Police talk about what they can do and what they will do to solve specific problems.”

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35 Ibid.
With the completion of Phase I, the PRP turned its attention to Phase II beginning in October 2009. It developed a Project Document that provided an assessment of Phase I and charted out the scope and intent of Phase II. On the issue of community policing, the PRP found that in Phase I, key stakeholders had mixed sentiments about the initiative. Local community leaders agreed that significant positive developments have occurred at MTS in terms of police behaviour and the quality of services provided. However, they believe that such changes were only possible owing to the existence of the non-political Caretaker Government (CTG) at the Centre and were thus concerned that the achievements of MTS and CPFs would be lost if these institutions were not protected from politicisation during democratic administrations.

Similarly, CPF members believed that strong political commitment from the government and continued police support was needed to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of CPFs in the future.

Moving forward, the PRP will support the Bangladesh police to implement the National Community Policing Strategy, which outlines the standards and guidelines for the operation of over 20,000 Community Policing Forums, Thana Open Days and training of key personnel. The Forums are designed to improve the security of the local community by solving their problems in a participatory manner. It is expected that the Forums will help create a more accessible, accountable and effective police service by conducting outreach programmes such as school visits and awareness campaigns on local issues.

The major objective of community policing under Phase II is to establish a sustainable structure through which community policing will function. This extends from the Crime Prevention Cell at Headquarters to the District level and down to the thana and the individual Forum. To achieve this, PRP will target 8,400 Forums and will build police capacity to monitor operational implementation in accordance with the National Community Policing Strategy.

The key outputs in this regard for Phase II include:

1. Integration of the community policing philosophy into policing operations at all levels, nationwide.

2. Effective community policing forums.

3. Improved access to justice through refurbishment and ongoing support to women-friendly Model Thanas.

Specifically, the following activities are to be conducted during Phase II to achieve these outputs:

1. Community policing philosophy is to be integrated into policing operations at all levels, nationwide

   - Support the Crime Prevention Centre in Police Headquarters to act as the central research, policy and strategy formulation body.

   - Support efforts to review the National Community Policing Strategy and Crime Prevention Strategy through an Advisory Committee representing concerned government agencies and NGOs to provide guidance and strategic direction on Community Policing and Crime Prevention.

   - Support efforts to establish 70 community policing centres and 600 community policing cells to develop crime prevention plans, consistent with the national strategy, with the community.

   - Support the Bangladesh police to train 600 Community Policing Officers at the thana level and to establish a pool of qualified police and 240 NGO trainers on community policing and crime prevention.

   - Support Bangladesh police to undertake joint police-community events, including school visits and workshops, and interactions on the concepts and methodologies of community policing and crime prevention.

   - Undertake at least two surveys to gauge public perceptions associated with community policing and identify possible interventions.

   - Support efforts to develop and implement incentives, schemes and performance rewards to develop creative solutions to local problems.

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*ibid., p. 10.

*ibid., pp. 33-34.
2. Effective community policing forums

- Support the establishment and dissemination of standard guidelines and implementation plans for Community Policing Forums and NGOs to create an understanding of the roles, responsibilities and standard operating procedures.

- Support efforts to develop and implement community policing monitoring plans for Metropolitan and District Community Policing Centres (70) and Community Police Officers (600).

- Support efforts to strengthen 8,400 Community Policing Forums:
  - Train forums on their roles and responsibilities with support from police and NGO trainers,
  - Develop community action plans, and
  - Undertake orientation and awareness raising with NGOs and Community Policing Officers.

- Support to enhance and promote regular interaction between Community Policing Forums and the informal and formal justice sector, such as village courts and ADR.

3. Improved access to justice through refurbishment and ongoing support to women-friendly model Thanas

- Support efforts to develop criteria and present advice to the Steering Committee to identify 18 Thanas to be refurbished as model Thanas. Once approved, support efforts to refurbish, equip and train staff for up to 18 MIs. Model Thanas will include women's toilet(s), a quiet room for victims and juveniles, and improved barracks, particularly for policewomen.

- Provide ongoing support to MIs, such as additional hardware and training.

The fact that an area of priority for the PRP on community policing focuses on women, dovetails well with NGO and donor efforts to improve gender-responsive community-based policing as outlined earlier in this chapter.

Training

Within Phase II three different types of training are imparted in relation to community policing. The one for senior officers spans five days, for the Community Policing Officers who work with the CPF involves three days of training and one day workshop for officers working in the 246 Thanas dealing with CPFs.

In June 2011, a Strategic Planning Working Group comprising seven police officers and chaired by an officer of the rank of a Deputy Inspector General was formed. External consultants who had drafted the first strategic plan were also engaged. The new plan identified ten priority areas:

1. Crime Management: Improve mechanisms by which people can report crimes; computerisation of police stations; improving the criminal database.

2. Public Order Management: Increase police public ratios and develop calendars of major events and strategies to deal with planned/unplanned events.

3. Traffic Management.

4. Intelligence Management: Improve intelligence sharing between the various wings of the police department. Currently there is no laid down procedure for information and intelligence sharing between agencies.

5. Community Policing: Embed community policing into the system; Review the current CPFs.

6. Human Resources (management and organisation structures): Includes welfare and accountability. Also includes improving the police population ratio to 1.800.

7. Logistics and Infrastructure Management: Modernisation of police stations, building of new barracks, more police lines in Dhaka/Chittagong.

8. Training: Improve basic training, build proficiency in English in the lower ranks, ensure shooting ranges, improve quality of training in terms of crime scene management and investigation.

9. ICT: Incorporate ICT strategy which has already been approved by the police.
10. **Service Delivery** Establish a standardised service delivery system across all police stations, improve access to Internet, create online registers and make police more gender-sensitive.

Expected to be brought out by June 2012 the new plan will span two years – 2012 to 2014. With much of the first strategic plan not being implemented this one is said to be more achievable and realistic. Widespread consultations were held with senior management; Focus Group discussions were held with a wide range of people, and a thematic questionnaire was circulated within the police. It is hoped that with such a consultative process and with the input of so many stakeholders this Plan will be more successful.

Community policing within the new Plan is again a priority area. However the specifics of this are yet to be seen.

Additionally, a mid-term review in the form of a Rapid Assessment Survey (RAS) of the impact of the funding on community policing was conducted by independent consultants. Though the report of the survey is not yet out, the main findings of the survey were fairly positive. They indicated that there was increased interaction between the police and community. The success was greater in rural than in urban areas where people’s confidence in the police had risen; police stations had become more accessible and there was an increase in reporting crime.

### 3.3 Assessment

#### 3.3.1 Philosophy

The Bangladesh police and the PRP have rightly acknowledged that community policing is not a technique, a quick fix or a top-down approach.\(^{40}\) Moreover, when the PRP was in the midst of Phase I, they conducted baseline surveys to assess people’s opinion of the Bangladesh police. This baseline data was primarily used to assess the efficacy of Model Thanas.\(^{41}\) In addition, they have admirably set out a succinct and comprehensive philosophical framework for their community policing initiative.\(^{42}\)


### 3.3.2 Strategy

An important aspect of the Bangladesh police’s larger police reform effort was their strategic plan for 2008-2010. For the first time, the Bangladesh police were explicit and thoughtful in charting out a three-year plan on improving their effectiveness and functioning. In this plan, the Bangladesh police set out clear benchmarks for their organisation. The fact that very few police organisations in South Asia take the time or effort to put together a strategic plan is a testament to the importance the Bangladesh Police place on planning.

The publications *Community Policing: National Strategy for Bangladesh and Community Policing – Service Manual* were useful in delineating a strategy for community policing. Both these reports are fairly detailed on how community policing should be structured and approached. In fact, even the Project Document for Phase II of the PRP is a wholesome iteration of what specific steps need to be taken in order to improve community policing in Bangladesh. Importantly, the Project Document sets out benchmarks to adhere to as Phase II progresses.

However, while the strategic foundation is generally...
sound, a concern is that too much emphasis is placed on the ability of a singular Community Police Officer (CPO) to effectively work with the community to define priorities of engagement. Unlike Kerala, where there may be 10-12 beat constables in a particular thana to deliver community policing, only 600 CPFs are being trained across Bangladesh, statistically that places, at most, one CPO for each thana. In 2011-12 an additional 105 senior officers were trained. This arrangement heightens the risk that the CPO will be viewed as merely an adjunct to “normal” policing rather than a genuine reorientation of policing philosophy.

Another limitation or weakness of the initiative is the problem of frequent transfers. This has resulted in officers being unable to forge ties with the community and the community being unable to gain familiarity with its beat officer.

3.3.3 Tactics
The failure to initially set up CPFs systematically was a strategic and tactical error on the part of the Bangladesh Police. Fortunately, the PRP has made it clear that strengthening the CPFs will be a priority during Phase II. The strategic plan for 2012-2014 also underlines this. However, it remains unclear whether the PRP will disband currently dysfunctional CPFs and start afresh. There is great value to the idea since Bangladesh is a large country of over 160 million people. It was incredibly unwise to think at the outset that it was feasible after decades of colonial and feudal style law enforcement, to simultaneously implement community policing in every district. A more realistic course of action would have been to roll out CPFs in a phased manner, similar to what is being done with Model Thanas.

Nevertheless, the composition and structure of the CPF and coordinating committees at the Union, Thana and District levels are effective in procuring community inputs on matters of public safety. By having a wide cross section of community members involved in these forums, a diversity of opinion ensures that all perspectives are considered, and more importantly, addressed.

A challenge that continues to bedevil the Bangladesh police and the PRP is the failure to secure the requisite political consensus for community policing. While there was a high-level political buy-in during the CTG for the idea of community policing, anecdotal evidence increasingly suggests that politicians from both major political parties seem disinterested in a truly non-political approach to community policing. Whether it was the poorly conceived and vaguely monitored CPFs at the outset, or increasingly politicised forces compromising police reforms post-CTG, the political will to usher in more people-friendly policing in Bangladesh appears absent.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Bangladesh police and PRP appear genuinely determined to take the necessary corrective measures to improve community policing in Bangladesh. For example, the Bangladesh police have come to terms with ten NGOs to work together on establishing and strengthening victim support centres. This type of outreach to NGOs did not happen at the beginning of the PRP.

Further, the PRP has made it a priority to train CPOs properly on the best means to interact with the public and the strategies that are particularly useful to build trust with the community. In addition to the National Strategy on Community Policing, Community Policing - Service Manual is a clear guide on the way community policing can be carried out at the local level. The Project Document for Phase II makes it clear that the Crime Prevention Unit will train CPOs.

One approach of community policing that has been a cause of concern is the involvement of local men in performing very basic policing duties, particularly night patrol. These men are paid a nominal monthly amount (with money collected from the community) for services rendered. By all accounts, this programme has been effective in alleviating the burden on the police and gives the locals a say and stake in how their communities are policed. Unfortunately though, there have been instances where locals involved in community policing have used their position as a cover for vigilantist behaviour. This is why policing by the community should never be confused with community policing. Even if some benefits accrue from such strategies (i.e. assisting the police in addressing manpower shortages),

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44 Interview with CPF members in Bogra, 6 March 2010.
the risk of vigilantism is too great to justify this form of community policing.

3.3.4 Organisation
Despite political difficulties in community policing gaining traction, the senior leadership of the Bangladesh police has pushed this agenda of police reform very hard. Whether it was former IGP, Nur Mohammad, or PRP National Director, NBK Tripura, and the present Director, Mr Rehman, the higher echelons of the Bangladesh police have been strong proponents to make the police behave and function in a more people-friendly manner. However, it is generally acknowledged that mid-level and junior officers feel no ownership of the reform initiatives because the major thrust of the PRP is not focused on salary or other pecuniary benefits, which are of particular interest to junior cadres.41

The senior police leadership and the PRP made a few organisational decisions that were expected to improve the chances for community policing to succeed. A decision was made not to transfer CPOs at the thana level for at least three years.42 This would ensure that CPOs can forge a strong relationship with the community without fearing a premature transfer. The opportunity to build such trust would have bode well for community policing during Phase II. However, as stated above, transfers still remain frequent and often unjustified. Second, the PRP made a conscious decision to constantly monitor and evaluate the progress of its initiatives, including community policing. The advantage of this is that there are many opportunities to take corrective action if police leadership is in control of what is happening.

3.4 Recommendations
Strengthen CPFs where possible and consider disbanting the non-functioning ones: Since there were problems with CPFs during Phase I of the PRP, greater attention needs to be directed to this initiative during Phase II. Some steps that could be undertaken include:

a. Work closer with civil society organisations that were successful with CPFs and learn from their experiences
b. Ensure that there is universality, or at least consis-

c. Strengthen training mechanisms of the police and community organisations that can transfer the necessary tools to deal with community issues. This includes mainstreaming human resources and training activities by integrating the community policing component into basic and advanced training programmes.

d. Increase the number of consultations between the police and community. The success of community policing is ultimately contingent on open and constant dialogue.

Depoliticise CPFs: While there may be no way to avoid the inclusion of local politicians in some capacity, great care should be taken to ensure that only those elected officials who have a credible standing are invited to participate. In addition, invited politicians should be given training on human rights. At all costs, political activity within the CPF should be banned.

Do not use community policing to address manpower shortages: Eliminate the practice introduced in Phase I of local men performing basic policing duties. Despite personnel shortages, the Bangladesh police should not be tempted to treat community policing as policing by the community. The risk of vigilantism supersedes any benefits that come with such citizen policing.

Do more to include vulnerable groups, such as women and the poor, in community policing: In addition to the PRP objective of having women constitute 33 per cent of CPFs, female CPF members should be given mentoring and leadership training to improve their confidence in speaking at and leading CPFs.

Move away from the CPO model and adopt a beat constable system: The problem with the CPO model is that it does little to achieve organisational transformation. With just one police officer at the thana responsible for community policing, there is less incentive for other officers to become more explicitly involved in liaising with the community. By adopting a beat constable system whereby 10-12 constables in a thana are asked to regularly interact with the community, there is greater likelihood for all policing to be viewed as community policing.

4.1 Background

In the past, a version of community policing existed in Indian villages. Crime control was entrusted to the village community, which operated through its elected representatives in the Panchayats. The Police Act, 1861, which set up a colonial police force in India, also contains provisions on citizens’ duties regarding maintenance of law and order but citizens have hardly ever been involved in policing.

Despite far-reaching changes in governance, when India transitioned from a colonised nation to a sovereign republic, the Central Government of India retained the archaic Police Act of 1861. Although policing remains a state subject, many states in India have chosen to model their own police legislation after the 1861 Act. Designed to control a subject population, the 1861 Act had little provisions for the community in policing affairs save the responsibility of members of the public to provide assistance to the police when required. With the surge in population and increase in crime, the police enlisted the community’s assistance mainly for investigation purposes. Community policing was restricted to using the community to get willing witnesses and better informers. The police complained that the community was uncooperative and, in fact, created hindrances in their functioning. The community perceived the police as a source of nuisance and even exploitation. Thus in most instances, community policing was forced on people rather than seeking their views and involvement.

In the 1970s, community policing experiments were initiated in several states within India. Some programmes such as crime prevention weeks, setting up of boys’ clubs, the Second Saturday Sports Meet were positive efforts to establish police-public contact. The Delhi Police implemented schemes such as Special Police Officers (1985), the Neighbourhood Watch (1989) through neighbourhood watch committees formed in each block, adoption of crime hot spots, and formation of anti-sexual harassment squads, to bring policing closer to the community. Similar initiatives were taken in many other states – Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Punjab and Karnataka. These included the formation of Mohalla Committees to check communal violence in Bhiwandi (Maharashtra), Citizen Committees in Karnataka and Village Vigilance Committees in Tamil Nadu. However, all these efforts were limited, as the community remained on the margins of the policing system. A common feature of all these initiatives was the failure to police along with the community.

This chapter will not survey every experiment with community policing in India since there are too many to explore and many of them are similarly modelled. Rather, this chapter will first examine notable experiments that provide some instruction on the tactics or approaches that should be avoided if possible, and then delve deeper into an experiment that provides a good road map for other police organisations in South Asia to emulate when crafting an approach to community policing.

Entry 2 (List II), Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India, 1950.

Depending on the particular state’s commitment to good governance and democratic policing, past and current attempts at community policing in India vary significantly in terms of both vision and implementation.
4.1.1 Village Defence Committees (Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh)

Due to the sometimes-difficult terrain of India, as well as the remoteness of some villages, policing all parts of the country without a full complement of personnel is a significant challenge for state police cadres. As such, some states have felt compelled to establish Village Defence Committees (VDCs), which comprise village-based adults trained to handle simple firearms, so that they may help police monitor the remote countryside. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), VDCs were initially set up in September 1995 to help curtail the increasing militant incursions into the mountainous parts of India-administered J&K. Both men and women villagers were trained to fire 303 Royal Enfield rifles, with some “Special Police Officers” paid Rs. 1,500 a month (which has now increased to Rs. 3,600 per month). VDC members are expected to act only for self-defence to:

- Use the weapons in self-defence against any terrorist attack
- Assist the security forces in any operation in remote areas
- Act as the eyes and ears of the security forces
- Deny shelter and forced assistance to terrorists and to block their supply routes.

However, as time passed, “VDC groups would span out into vigilance squads at nightfall and repulse terrorist attacks with the help of light firearms and information inputs provided by coordinating special police officers.” Consequently, in the last 14 years, 131 members of VDCs have been killed. Yet, police reliance on VDCs continues with 500 groups currently in the Kashmir Valley and 1986 in Jammu Province.

Similarly, Village Defence Parties (VDPs), also known as Gram Rakshak Dals, were set up in Maharashtra in accordance with Section 63 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. This provision enables the Superintendent of Police to set up VDPs to strengthen the existing police force not only in terms of manpower, but also for defence against robbers, dacoits, fighting natural calamities, night patrolling and intelligence collection of all sorts, especially with regard to illicit activities such as bootlegging, gambling, and drug peddling in the villages. VDP members are not paid and are only given one day of basic training that is designed to cover the use of lathis (batons) and whistles, patrolling and fundamental aspects of law and police functioning.

Such village-based policing strategies are notable examples of how overwhelmed and understaffed state police cadres are to contend with the institutional shortcomings that prevent them from properly policing their jurisdictions. Instead of raising the capacity of state police cadres to perform their assigned tasks, some police organisations have chosen to outsource their responsibility to community members. As mentioned in the Introduction, community policing does not mean policing by the community. The lack of sufficient training and the failure to provide an accountability structure for the manner in which VDC or VDP members conduct themselves are examples of how this approach to “community policing” is endemically flawed. For instance, it is pointed out that VDC members in J&K extort other community members because there is no check on their “authority”. Consequently, these powers are abused and there is little remedy available to their victims.

Encouragement for police is not about arming communities. Community policing is to allow residents to work hand-in-hand with the police in making their villages safe and free from criminal activities. The strength of community policing lies in its collaborative approach to ensure public safety, wherein the police are at all times responsible for enforcement, not by shifting those duties from the professional (police) to the novice (public). To do so is to invite a system where poorly trained laymen are at risk and there is no accountability for their conduct.

4.1.2 Friends of the Police (Tamil Nadu)

The Friends of Police (FOP) project in Tamil Nadu is a community policing initiative started in 1993 by Dr Prateep Philip (IGP). It began in Ramanad District and was extended by Government Order to the rest of the

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52 Ibid.
state in September 1994. It seeks to build a problem-solving relationship between the police and the public. The essential principles underlying this concept include building bridges, empowerment, service commitment and transparency.\(^{54}\) FOP personnel have been identified, trained and deployed for night rounds, temple events, traffic maintenance and other law and order issues. Any adult member of the public who is not involved in a civil or criminal case can become a member of the FOP.

The basic premise behind FOPs is that they should have a constant and healthy interaction with the police, whereby critical information is shared between the two to improve public security and satisfy the objective of transitioning towards the “humanization and socialization of the police force.” “FOPs can pass on useful information, can encourage police personnel and give useful suggestions to solve local problems, accompany policemen on night beats or move in groups wearing FOP badges in the area of their residence so as to cover up to 500 houses. Each FOP who has ticked the activity ‘Night Rounds’ is expected to spend at least six hours in a month in such an activity. FOPs who have chosen the option traffic assistance should be given training in traffic signs and regulations and will be expected to spend at least three hours a month in traffic assistance.”\(^{55}\)

Surveys were conducted in specific districts, such as Tirunelvi, as well as a holistic one of all the districts in Tamil Nadu (1996) to reveal equivocal statistics. Whilst 78 per cent\(^{56}\) of the people confirmed the beneficial nature of the FOP in Tirunelvi, the overall survey of Tamil Nadu disclosed a staggering 62 per cent affirming the FOP as advantageous in the investigation of crime and 83 per cent in its maintenance of law and order. Inclusion is a key aspect to democratic ruling; there is a direct correlation between exclusion and the rise in militancy or crime. Thus, the irregularity arises with an increase in crime rate over the years despite growing public inclusion.\(^{57}\) Statistics suggest a lack of awareness as a possible cause for this disparity (only 56 per cent of the public is fully aware of the movement).\(^{58}\)

However, notwithstanding efforts to expand the reach of FOPs through a Government Order, it has not taken off beyond Ramanad district during its 17 long years of existence. Although thousands have become FOPs since the programme’s inception, the public-police interaction and the overarching vision of FOP has not been systematised outside the district. This is a good example of how a programme, when solely driven by enthusiastic police leadership in a district, can only succeed in that jurisdiction. For the attempt to truly succeed and proliferate across the entire police organisation, the most senior leadership of the state cadre has to identify key universal elements that can be replicated across the state. This has not been adequately done in Tamil Nadu and remains the greatest shortcoming of FOPs.

4.1.3 Mohalla Committees (Maharashtra)

In the aftermath of the 1992 communal riots in Mumbai that killed approximately 900 people, police officials and civil society leaders were desperate for an approach to policing that could bridge the significant divide between religious communities. In addition, the police had considerable work to do to repair its relationship with the Muslim community, many of whom perceived the police as being biased against them during those dark days at the end of 1992 and early 1993.

While attempting to formulate an approach, senior police leaders examined the experience in Bhiwandi, a town outside Mumbai that had earlier experienced frequent communal riots but had surprisingly evaded those of 1992-1993. The reason, in the years leading up to the 1992 riots, the Deputy Superintendent of Police had set up 70 mohalla (or neighbourhood) committees in Bhiwandi, each with a hundred from the Muslim and Hindu communities. They met once a month before religious festivals and did their best to ensure open lines of communication and constant interaction.\(^{59}\) The committee conducted monthly meetings before religious festivals, devising ways to both bolster healthy interaction and ensure open lines of communication.\(^{60}\)

\(^{54}\) Presentation of Prateep Philip IPS, IGP Tamil Nadu at Kerala Police “Community Policing Condave” on 3-4 November 2010.


\(^{56}\) Dr. K. Jaishankar – Community Policing in Tirunelvi City

\(^{57}\) http://www.tnpolice.gov.in/cmpede.html

\(^{58}\) Dr. K. Jaishankar – Community Policing in Tirunelvi City


\(^{60}\) Barve, S. (2003), Healing Streams – Bringing Hope in the Aftermath of Violence, (Penguin Books) at p. 169.
When the Mahim Mohalla Committee was first launched in Mumbai shortly after the riots in 1992, it was unsuccessful because not enough time had passed, nor efforts expended, to rebuild community trust in the police. It was only a few months later when the former Commissioner of Mumbai Police, Mr Julio Ribeiro, and civil society leader, Ms Sushobha Barve, were able to make the mohalla committees (also known as Peace Committees) work effectively. Essentially, each of the 24 committees that were ultimately set up throughout the city had respected elders to lead the efforts to maintain cordial relations between Hindus and Muslims.

The members would intervene in disputes or domestic quarrels. In addition, they would organise regular meetings or programmes in collaboration with the nearest police station.

Mohalla committees proved exceedingly helpful in precipitating healthier dialogue between religious groups following the riots and improving the community’s perception of the police. Its primary and overriding objective was greater communal harmony between two specific religious groups. However, with the change in leadership the initiative has been unable to sustain itself. Though the Maharashtra Police claim that Mohalla Committees have become an integral part of their community policing initiative, it has failed to show the same results. It is restricted to a small locality; doesn’t get the same attention it did; there is no long-term strategy or planning; and the process still remains to be institutionalised within the police.

Mumbai is a multicultural melting pot. It takes pride in its diversity and the ability of its many communities to live peacefully. However over the past 15 years, majority communalism has been allowed to flourish and has spawned the radicalisation of the minority. The city is now both a hub of radicalisation and of terrorist attacks. Each attack polarises the population while inhibiting the natural integrative traditions of the city. One key factor in radicalisation is the police’s treatment of the minority. Though dissatisfaction with policing is widespread, minority experiences at its hands are a major cause for embitterment and resort to violence – most especially amongst the community’s youth.

The values, specialisations, training, tools and mechanisms required for policing a multicultural society have never been a matter of much attention in policy circles. Rather, it has been taken for granted that it is being done correctly. But the inability of the police to gather intelligence, prevent terrorist attacks, or detect perpetrators is indication enough of its inability to work in tandem with communities who may be close to them.

Preventing militancy is high on the new government’s agenda. Its manifesto also explicitly mentions the need for better policing. More effective intelligence gathering has been emphasised. This requires the confidence of the community. But there is at present little institutional understanding within the police on how to go about building this or what it does that alienates the minority. This study would address that gap and be a precursor to other evidence-based presentations from civil society to the police that provide guidance of what needs improving.

In November 2000, Aashwas, a programme tailored to help child victims of violence and insurgency in Assam, was introduced as part of the community policing project. The purpose of attaining a violence-free society for children was sensitising the population at the grassroots level. The National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development (NIPCCD) was employed to provide specialised training to police personnel. Between 2002 and 2006, a total of 1,538 police personnel (over a range of ranks from DySP to ASI) attended orientations conducted by NIPCCD. Additionally, a Social Mobilization Campaign was introduced on 6 November 2004 in Majuli, replacing the sensitisation campaign with a set of intensive activities including medical and health camps, publication of a book, essay competitions and educational tours; police-children interaction. A “Sishu Shanti Samaroh”, which is a silent procession, was organised in December 2006 that saw the participation of a large crowd; the success of this scheme was affirmed by its repetition in 2008, 2009 and 2010 in different districts, targeting the alleviation of agony and disorientation from victims’ lives. Despite the introduction of Aashwas, which aims at developing and creating a humane approach towards children and those living in conflict situations, the crime rate in Assam has continued to accelerate over the past four years.

The programme did help bridge the rift between the police and public, however, it did not attain satisfactory

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results on crime reduction. The government's ongoing differences with ULFA have also greatly contributed to the disturbed state of North East India. The police's failures, however, to reduce the rate of murder, kidnapping and rape in Assam starting from 2006, exemplifies the existence of a systemic flaw and calls for further restructuring.

4.2 Case Study: Kerala (Janamaitri Suraksha Project)

The Kerala Police Performance and Accountability Commission was set up in November 2003. Headed by a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice K. T. Thomas, the Commission was tasked to evaluate the general performance of the police, examine the effectiveness of the autonomy given to the police and make recommendations for further improving the functioning and accountability of the police. The Commission in its report, strongly emphasised the need for a community policing scheme to be introduced in the state on an experimental basis. In its report the Commission said:

Community policing is a measure which can be strongly recommended for implementation in order to achieve transparency in the police administration. Police will have to evolve a mechanism for discussing crime prevention strategies with the members of the community by holding regular meetings... We know that mobilization of community for supporting the police will have resistance in this state mainly because of the traditional antipathy of the common man towards the police. So it would take time to achieve the benefits of community policing. Even if there is no immediate result the scheme should be evolved and commenced without delay.

On the basis of that recommendation, the government asked the Police Department to prepare and submit a draft scheme on community policing. The Kerala Police formulated one and circulated it in early 2007 to a large number of people. Seminars were subsequently held throughout the state to invite feedback from various stakeholders.

This process culminated in a state-level consultation in September 2007 that brought together key figures belonging to parties across the political spectrum and several civil society actors, including police officers from all parts of India that had pioneered community policing experiments in their home jurisdictions. Getting political and social consensus at the very outset of this effort was critical to its ultimate success.

Based on the suggestions that emanated from the consultation, the Kerala Police amended their draft and sent it to the government. The government accepted the scheme and passed a Government Order on 23 November 2007 that launched the Pilot project in 20 of the 440 police stations across the state. This initiative was entitled the Janamaitri Suraksha Project (loosely translated as “people-friendly security project”). Specifically, three Janamaitri Suraksha Projects (JSPs) were set up in each of the three major urban centres (Kochi, Kochi, Thrivennanthapuram) and one in each of the other eleven districts of Kerala. Owing to the enormous success of these initial JSPs, 21 more were set up in August, 2009. As a result of the increasing demand and popularity of the initiative, towards the end of 2010 community policing was introduced in 100 additional police stations.

At the outset it was identified that the objective of the JSP would be threefold:
1. Prevention of crime
2. Achieving police-public cooperation on security matters
3. Ensuring the mutual cooperation of members of the public in the domain of security.

To that end, it was felt that the best way to accomplish these objectives was to implement a system that had two important components: “Beat Officers” and “Janamaitri Samithis” (or “people-friendly committees”).

Since community policing works best when the community is afforded an opportunity to build trust and a relationship with specific police personnel, the Kerala police felt it was important to assign one Beat

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Officer for every one thousand households in a well-defined geographical space (approximately 3 km). The expectation was that these Beat Officers, who would be handpicked and hold the rank of Constable, Head Constable or Assistant Sub-Inspector, would patrol (on foot or motorcycle) his/her jurisdiction for at least 20 hours per week. In addition, the Beat Officer would meet people at a pre-designated time and place, at least three times a week, for a dialogue with community members about concerns or complaints, in a setting away from the police station.

By getting to know every nook and corner of the designated area, and interacting with every family at least once within the first three months of the assignment, the Beat Officer would become intimately aware of all the community’s issues and concerns. With 10-14 Beat Officers per police station, the intention was to ensure that all citizens falling within that particular jurisdiction have a relationship with a Beat Officer. Moreover, if a Beat Officer is not a woman then a female Constable accompanies him in order to ensure that women’s problems are addressed appropriately.

In addition to Beat Officers, the other critical element to the proper functioning of the JSP was the constitution of “Janamatri Samithis” or “people-friendly committees”. The purpose of these committees is to formalise the interface between community and police personnel. By providing the community an opportunity to be actively involved in the prioritisation of security matters, there is greater public ownership over the JSP and it enables the police to interact on a regular basis with key community members.

In each pilot project the Station House Officer, and perhaps the Circle Inspector, nominates the persons to be included in the Samithi (or “Committee”). The Sub-Divisional Police Officer may examine such names and the list of names is submitted to the District Police Superintendent. After due inspection, the District Police Superintendent forms the Samithi.

The Samithi must have proportionate representation of women and the Schedules Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Moreover, citizens from the locality who are active in the educational and cultural field are to be included in the Committee. The following are examples of who may sit on Samithis:

- Teachers
- Retired police officers
- Ward councillors
- Merchants
- NGO activists
- Labourers
- Residential Association members.

The samithi must have at least ten but not more than 25 members. Those who are involved in any criminal case are not included in the Committee. Moreover, office bearers of any political party need not be included in the samithi and care should be taken to avoid allegations that any communal or political interest is given an advantage. The structure of the samithi should be in such a way that ordinary citizens get an opportunity to utilise their high civic sense and sense of social responsibility for the safety of society at the local level.

The Samithi Chairperson is the Circle Inspector of police and he may expel any member who becomes involved in a crime case or indulges in moral turpitude. The Committee must meet at least once a month at a previously notified place and any resident within the local area of the police station may attend the meeting to give suggestions or air complaints. Ideally, all decisions should be unanimous; if there is a difference of opinion, the Samithi should not proceed if more than 20 per cent of the Committee objects.

During the meetings the following may be discussed:

1. Any matter concerned with the security of the area, such as theft, robbery, bootlegging, traffic offences, etc.

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68 Ibid at p. 6.
70 Ibid., at p. 19.
71 Ibid., at p. 6.
73 Ibid., at p. 2.
74 Ibid., at p. 2.
75 Ibid., p. 3.
2. The introduction of patrolling with a view to prevent crime.
3. Organisation of awareness programmes to educate the public about reducing crime and security measures to be installed/introduced in the area.
4. Information regarding organised crimes in the area can be shared in the committee.

A ground rule for all such meetings is that disputes between individuals and cases under investigation/trial should not be discussed.

The JSP Committee may formulate and implement, depending on local perception, one or more of the following types of plans for betterment of policing and crime prevention in the area, using the resources of both the Kerala Police and the community. The activities may be undertaken either directly by the Committee or by special purpose groups nominated by it.\textsuperscript{76}

a. Night patrolling projects with the cooperation of the public
b. Schemes coordinating the work of private security guards
c. Projects to get to know new residents and strangers in the area
d. Fitting burglar alarms and other security systems in residential complexes
e. Specific schemes to aid senior citizens and physically challenged citizens after assessing their special needs; help lines may also be started to aid them
f. Implementation of special projects for the protection of women and children
g. Awareness programmes to popularise the Crime Stopper System, so that if the public notices the commission of any crime, they may immediately call the police on 1030 and inform them
h. Traffic Warden System to give the public as well as students an opportunity to acquire good civic sense and perform social service
i. Awareness classes on subjects such as road safety
j. Information regarding repair and maintenance of street and traffic lights to be given to the concerned authorities
k. Implementation of projects encouraging blood donation, eye donation and organ donation camps; organisation of medical camps, environmental protection and cleaning camps, maintenance of a register containing blood groups, telephone numbers and addresses of blood donors for use during emergencies
l. In schools, organisation of vigilance cells, legal literacy and traffic awareness programmes
m. Lessons on unarmed combat or yoga in schools
n. Organisation of a security and traffic awareness programme for taxi and auto rickshaw drivers, railway porters and labourers
o. Prevention of the sale of illicit sale of liquor, drugs and pan masala close to schools by organising appropriate projects
p. Collection of intelligence about illegal financial institutions and illicit distillation centres, as well as making the public aware of such crimes
q. Setting up of projects to rescue people injured in motor accidents; classes on First Aid and evacuation during crises
r. Setting up Victim Support Cells to aid victims of violent crimes; rehabilitation of victims and legal aid to conduct crime cases could be extended to the victims through such Cells.

Besides police stations, the JSP extends to even the district level where an Advisory Committee headed by the District Superintendent of Police is formed to ensure proper supervision on the functioning of the Janamaithri Suraksha Project. Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislative Assembly, Municipal Chairmen/ Mayors as well as other important personalities nominated by the Superintendent of Police are included in the committee. The committee may comprise 10 to 20 members. It may convene a meeting once in three months to review the working of the Janamaithri Suraksha Samithis of the concerned District and give necessary suggestions and instructions to improve their performance.

Those directing police reform initiatives in Kerala clearly understood the concept of community policing, and specifically, the idea of Janamaithri Samithis as a key dimension of the reform process. The significance attached to them is reflected in the incorporation of community policing into legislation. In January 2011, a new Kerala Police Act was passed by the State Legislature. The Act institutionalised the community policing scheme by inserting provisions that made community policing mandatory.\textsuperscript{77} This was a very

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 4-6.

\textsuperscript{77} Section 64, Kerala Police Act. Community Policing. (1) The District Police Chief shall constitute Community Contact
encouraging and intelligent move. With changing police leaderships, the scheme could have been ignored or not given sufficient priority.

Committees for each police station, comprising the local residents of the area as representatives of the community, to give general assistance to the Police in the discharge of their duty. (2) The Community Contact Committee shall have a fair representation of all categories of the society including persons from service and professional sectors, women and persons belonging to SC/ST communities under the jurisdiction of the police station. (3) No person who had been sentenced to imprisonment by a criminal court or who had been dismissed, removed, discharged or compulsorily retired from any employment on grounds of corruption, moral turpitude or misconduct in the previous five years shall be nominated as a member of the Community Contact Committee. (4) The Community Contact Committee shall identify the existing and emerging needs for Police services of common nature in the area which needs due consideration by police and also to develop action plans for ensuring the security of the area or any part thereof. (5) The Community Contact Committee shall meet as may be required. (6) The general public of that area may participate in the meetings of the Committee. (7) The Community Contact Committee shall encourage every citizen to bring to the notice of the police information about the offences happened and the possibility for the occurrence of offences. (8) The Community Contact Committee may form sub-committees for any specific purpose or for particular areas or for the specific functions. (9) The Community Contact Committee may formulate programmes for promoting security awareness, safety awareness, prevention of crimes and legal literacy, etc. (10) Community Contact Committee shall not undertake themselves any lawful authority of Police force such as investigation of crimes or maintenance of law and order.

4.2.1 Fort Police Station (Thiruvananthapuram)
In an interview with the Circle Inspector (CI) for Fort Police Station, A. Abdul Rahim, indicated that the JSP made the public more comfortable with the police and this led to greater cooperation between the community and the Kerala Police. Earlier, the police would only visit a neighbourhood if there were a problem. Now, they are far more proactive and make the beat rounds at least three times a week (sometimes more frequently, when time permits), even when there is no problem per se. The public is particularly appreciative of the fact that the police have undertaken extra efforts, such as ensuring that the Beat Officer will not visit a woman-only household without a female Assistant Beat Officer accompanying him.

Although there were originally 12 Beat Officers for Fort Police Station, there are currently only eight because of staffing deficits and the continued need to fill vacancies. This meant that each Beat Officer is responsible for approximately 2,000 households instead of the ideal 1,000 households. Consequently, Beat Officers are hard pressed to meet everyone on a daily basis because they are stretched too thin. This development in Fort Police Stations acutely demonstrates the need to have a properly resourced initiative. Otherwise, the stated objectives of greater police-public interaction will be more difficult to achieve.

4.2.2 Payyanur Police Station (Kannur)
The CI for Payyanur Police Station, P. K. Sudhakaran, reiterated that the greatest value of the JSP is the vastly improved relationship between the public and the police. Started on 28 March 2008, the JSP at Payyanur Police Station has 12 Beat Officers covering 15 Beats. In this case, the deficit is again attributable to an overall staffing shortage.

Each Beat Officer has access to a two-wheeler and a mobile phone and they can collectively use a designated jeep that comes with allocated funds for petrol. This is notable, because police organisations in South Asia typically have great difficulty in meeting the basic resource demands of field personnel. However, the Kerala Police appears committed to providing such material for the proper functioning of the JSP.
As a first step, the Beat Officers at Payyanur visited all of the households. During those visits, a booklet explaining in simple terms what the JSP was about was distributed. Shortly thereafter, legal awareness classes were started for students, women and youth.

As time progressed some of the programming became more focused. For example, an alcohol awareness programme was started recently that targets youth clubs and schools. This is to ensure that alcoholism (and by extension alcohol-fuelled criminal activity) does not become a problem for these young people in the future, and is a good example of how community policing seeks to prevent crime.

A particularly good illustration of how the JSP can effectively depoliticise the delivery of police services was given by one of the Beat Officers interviewed. He pointed out that owing to the trust-building initiatives that were undertaken, people have confidence that justice can be secured even if they belong to a smaller and less influential political party and bring a complaint against someone belonging to a larger and more influential one.

One of the shortcomings of the JSP in Payyanur is that there are only three women on the 21-member Samithi. Since the JSP Book and now the Kerala Police Act only calls for proportionate gender representation and does not stipulate a minimum requirement for women participation, sometimes gender representation is not what it ideally ought to be.

**4.2.3 Marad Police Station (Kozhikode)**

Setting up a JSP in Marad was a bold decision on the part of the Kerala Police. In January 2002 there were communal riots, followed by a second round of hostilities in May 2003. During both encounters Muslims and Hindus died, resulting in an incendiary environment that forced many Muslims to flee the area. When people returned to their homes, the District Collector converted a school into a camp for the displaced. After staying there for eight to nine months, these people were eventually relocated to their abandoned homes. Subsequently, relations between the two communities were tense and they rarely spoke to each other. To ensure that violence did not break out again, the Kerala police set up an extensive network of checkpoints in the affected areas. These checkpoints were designed to monitor the flow of people and goods into and out of the area.

In that backdrop, a JSP was set up in August 2009 during Phase II of the community policing project. With eight Beat Officers each responsible for at least 1,100-1,250 households, the police in Marad had their work cut out for them in this religiously divided community. For instance, according to CI Abdul Kader, tensions ran so high that at the inception of the JSP in Marad the community did very little to cooperate with the police on a census that was being conducted at the time.

As a first step, the police approached the residential associations as a means to improve relations within the community. Initially, some community members balked at the outreach. However, with time and persistence, the police could organise joint events that involved people from both the communities. In particular, a successful initiative was the Kerala police-facilitated training for women of both communities to jointly learn embroidery. The first session involved 75 women and a subsequent session had 50 women participants. This collaborative venture, involving the police and both religious communities, started breaking down barriers and improved the space for dialogue and healing.

However, notwithstanding the recently achieved progress, it is an uphill battle to restore full normalcy to this communally-affected area. In the immediate aftermath of the riots, 30 police checkpoints were set up to ensure that community members and/or outsiders were not organising further agitation or bringing in weapons. Over seven years later, 11 checkpoints still remain.

While the objective of these checkpoints is ostensibly to monitor the flow of people and goods, the fact remains that police interventions at these pickets are perfunctory and routine. No attempt is made to inspect passing vehicles closely, only names are checked. If the JSP’s objective is to establish greater trust between the police and the community, these police pickets have precisely the opposite effect. They are intrusive, an annoyance and place a constant cloud of suspicion over the populace. This is not an effective tactic to engender greater trust. And if the objective is security, then that also is not achieved since the rules no longer appear to be scrupulously applied.

It appears that if the police are truly sincere in forging a healthier relationship with the community that is rooted in confidence and trust, then they should remove the
remaining 11 checkpoints that only serve to stigmatise both Hindus and Muslims in the area. Some people have stated that the Beat Officers deployed in Marad have been unable to forge the kind of communication and dialogue that would permit the removal of the police pickets. If that is the case and this failure is due to overextension of duties or lack of capacity, then efforts should be undertaken to improve the quality of their training or to improve the quality of the Beat Officers selected to do this difficult job in Marad.

4.2.4 Palarivattom Police Station (Kochi)

Started on 26 March 2006, the JSP in Palarivattom currently has six Beat Officers covering over 22,000 households. There are six two-wheelers for the Beat Officers, two scooters for the six women Assistant Beat Officers and one collective jeep.

While accompanying Beat Officers on their patrol, it was evident that the JSP has done a very good job in reaching out to the community and is doing its best to address the scourge of alcoholism. In exchanges with the public, they articulated satisfaction with police performance and were happy that crime in the neighbourhood had declined since the JSP was started. Moreover, the influence of the JSP has resulted in less quarrelling within the community. Having the opportunity to express grievances to authoritative figures who are sympathetic and responsive, has minimised the tendency for community members to escalate otherwise straightforward disputes.

Unfortunately though, like the Samithi in Payyanur, the 21-member Samithi in Palarivattom has only three women on it. For community policing to work, it is important that this type of gender disparity does not exist within the Samithis. Women are 50 per cent of the population, and with gender-based violence such a pressing issue in Kerala and across South Asia, it is critical that women’s views are adequately represented in any reorientation towards community policing.

4.3 Assessment

4.3.1 Philosophy

When putting together the consultations in 2007, after Justice K. T. Thomas’ report, the Kerala police quickly identified the constabulary as the key group in desperate need of reform. Since the junior ranks are often the public’s first point of contact with police services, it is critical that the constabulary are respectful towards the community and responsive to their needs. This level of self-awareness is a critical ingredient to any successful reorientation of policing.

A mission statement emerged out of those consultations on the manner in which community policing ought to be formulated for Kerala. The objectives of the JSP were:

1. Prevention of crime
2. Achieving police-public cooperation on security matters
3. Ensuring the mutual cooperation of members of the public in the domain of security.

The Kerala police leadership was very clear at the outset more favourable crime statistics and arrest rates are not the primary objective of the JSP. In fact, if community policing works well, there would be better interaction between the police and public, resulting in better intelligence leading to more arrests, which may actually precipitate a rise in recorded crime. Therefore, the true barometer of success was to determine if public confidence in safety had increased subjectively and if personal security was objectively enhanced.\[16\]

That is the reason why one of the major shortcomings of the JSP’s approach was that it did not conduct baseline surveys on the public’s impression of the police before it introduced them. If one is to assess the subjective success of the initiative, one has to know what people’s opinion was at the outset so that data is available to compare when project evaluations are conducted at later stages. Having failed to do so, the Kerala police do not have any baseline data, which is unfortunate.

The consultations that were held throughout 2007 brought together key political figures and key stakeholders in civil society, law enforcement and academia, to define the structure of the initiative and the priorities of the engagement.

Although those consultations were successful in identifying priorities and setting out objectives, the JSP’s strategic shortcoming was that the Kerala police did not initially set benchmarks for success. Considerable good and thoughtful strategic planning was done, but

\[16\] Interview with Director General of Police (DGP) Mr Jacob Punnoose on 25 May 2010.
this did not take the form of delineated benchmarks. Benchmarks are useful because they provide markers along the way that management can use to correct any deficiencies that emerge from the process. While the Kerala police has been fairly good to date in making adjustments to the JSP, the articulation of benchmarks at the outset would have been a useful tool to assess their progress subsequently.

4.3.3 Tactics

If the Kerala police had a few modest shortcomings in their philosophical and strategic approach, their greatest strength is their development and execution of effective strategies. The decision to initiate the JSP in only 20 pilot police stations was strategic and thoughtful. By rolling out the JSP in less than 5 per cent of the station houses, the Kerala police could ensure that every Beat Officer in Phase I was qualified and well trained.

The creation of apolitical Samithis was an excellent way to formally bring together the community and the police to share ideas on bringing about public safety. The Samithis' strength was fortified by the police selecting the members based on their integrity and civic mindedness, and ensuring that the bodies were not politicised by the appointments they made. It is interesting to note that the Kerala Police leadership now observe that the JSPs are working well not merely because of the Samithi membership that mobilises public participation in the initiative. It was found that grass roots involvement resulted in non-Samithi members coming to meetings so to provide their feedback and inputs. While the composition of the Samithi remains important, that by itself does not guarantee success. It is important that the layman is also involved and that can only occur with greater awareness of the objectives and purposes of the JSP.

However there is one area of concern. The Samithis' constitution and selection of members is left entirely to the District Police Chief. There are concerns that members of the Samithis do not necessarily reflect the diversity of a particular community and are at times 'friends or favourites of the police'. Whilst this criticism may be unfounded, leaving the selection solely to the discretion of the District Police Chief will only escalate these concerns. For community policing to be truly effective, it should be inclusive and allow for maximum participation.

A crucial element leading to the success of any community policing initiative is the training of police/Beat Officers. The Kerala police laid great emphasis on this. Since the entire success of the JSP hinges on the effectiveness of the Beat Officers, it is critically important that their capacity is built so that they can solve problems and deal with the public in a thoughtful and respectful manner. JSP training is conducted at the State Level (in either Thrissur or Thrivananthapuram) by senior police officials where 40-50 people are trained over three days. When the JSP was implemented in the first 20 police stations of Phase I, the DGP, Jacob Punnoose, Dr B. Sandhya (IGP and Nodal Officer for the JSP) and Mr Hemachandran (IGP Range) personally interacted with each Beat Officer during the training phase.

Furthermore, during the training for Phase I, which was also done at the district level, community members were included. The training was largely about teaching Beat Officers on how to listen to people rather than simply expecting the public to obey them. In that way, their mindset had to be changed and this could be done only under the close supervision of senior police leadership.86

Political acceptance of this initiative was crucial for its success. The Kerala police managed this by getting both the ruling and opposition parties agreeing to the idea of community policing. As with any aspect of police reform, nothing substantive can be accomplished in the absence of political will. The important consultations in September 2007 laid the groundwork for a non-politicised approach to the JSP. If the JSP had been viewed as a political project, very little would have been accomplished.87 One sign of the JSP's success is that politicians from various political parties expressed an interest in undertaking community policing in their jurisdictions. With 140 Assembly seats in the state and only 43 JSPs underway, several MLAs are clamouring for Phase III JSPs to be initiated in their constituencies.88

Finally, the fact remains that the JSP would not work if it were inadequately resourced. In 2009, the JSP received

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86 Interview with DGP, Jacob Punnoose.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.

38 • Building Bridges Experiments with Community Policing in South Asia
Rs. 42 lakh and in 2010, Rs. 254 lakh.83 While more money is always required for ambitious undertakings such as the JSP, the Kerala government’s commitment to the initiative is evidenced by the substantial amount of funds they have allocated to date.

4.3.4 Organisation
The success of a community policing initiative is often contingent on the strength of that jurisdiction’s police leadership. In Kerala, the JSP benefited tremendously with DG Punnose and IGP Sandhya spearheading the effort. Both demonstrated a willingness to listen to the public, including non-governmental organisations and to adapt to constantly changing circumstances. Importantly, the Kerala government chose not to transfer DG Punnose prematurely and permitted him to stay on as Director General so that he may competently guide the JSP through its critical first steps. After the elections and the change in government in early 2011, there were no major transfers of crucial police posts. Even with a change in political leadership, the police leadership was permitted to continue functioning without major disruptions.

Additionally, the Kerala police has instituted strict criterion for the recruitment of Beat Officers. The criterion takes into account traits such as past performance, bad habits (i.e. drinking), and demonstrated good behaviour towards the public. Before selecting a Beat Officer, these assessments are done in consultation with his/her Station House Officer. Moreover, Kerala mandates that all its Constables should possess at least 10+2 education levels (meaning they have graduated from high school after 12 years of education).

These steps to ensure Beat Officers with better qualities were carried out so that the police leadership have the confidence to perform the most important task of the JSP: empower the Beat Officer to wield the necessary discretion to make community policing work. Community policing is successful when the public can have trust and forge a relationship with specific police personnel. To build such trust, the Beat Officer must be competent and have the flexibility to respond to the exigencies of everyday policing. Also, it is important that the Beat Officer views his role as a prestigious one, so that his own self-perception inevitably improves, along with the delivery of police services.84 Consistently, all Beat Officers interviewed for this report took great pride in their work and genuinely believed that they were making a positive difference in the lives of those within their beat. Almost to a person, the Beat Officers indicated that their current mandate (i.e. to really help the public) was the reason they wanted to become police officers in the first place.

4.3.5 Impact
To assess the success of the initiative, an independent Impact Assessment Study was conducted towards the end of 2010. A random survey of 1,101 people in Chengmanad and Pannyar police stations was carried out. Of the sample surveyed, 85.8 per cent were aware of the project, of which 80 per cent knew of it through direct contact. For a government programme, this is a laudable achievement. The majority of the people perceived the police as courteous. Significantly, they gave a rating of over 47 to the police on performance. Keeping in mind the general negative mindset that people had of the police, the rating was clearly an indicator of the achievements of the project.

Community policing yielded results. The number of murders declined in the State from 393 in 2006 to 325 in 2009. Offences in Kochi city went down by 38 per cent after community policing came into place.

A report of this impact assessment is still to be published. But surely the findings of this study should provide the Kerala police with some guidelines on how the JSPs can be improved.

4.3.6 Conclusion
Generally, Kerala is acknowledged as having the best human development performance of all the states in India.85 Perhaps high levels of literacy and education explain why Kerala’s move towards community policing has been so successful. However, making such a determination is outside the ambit of this particular study. What can be concluded is that the JSP has worked well because the Kerala police made a conscious decision at the outset to secure political will for the effort and it was systematic in its approach.

83 Interview with IGP, Dr B. Sandhya.
84 A. Hemachandran (IG Thiruvananthapuram Range) 24 May 2010.
The only pitfall that the Kerala police has to guard against is expanding too rapidly. By aiming to initiate the JSP in 100 police stations, the Kerala police runs the risk of expanding faster than they can adequately train Beat Officers to perform their duties in accordance with the philosophy and intent of the project. Since the efficacy of the Beat Officer is the linchpin in the entire design of the JSP, this risk could jeopardise the functioning and reputation of the project across the state.

However, notwithstanding this potential shortcoming, it would be quite fair and reasonable to characterise the Kerala police's community policing experiment as the most well-conceived and effective effort in South Asia.

### 4.4 Recommendations

**Provide adequate staff:** It was observed that many JSPs suffer from a reduction in Beat Officers owing to overall shortages in police personnel. If the Kerala police are to genuinely reorient policing in Kerala from traditional to community-based, then staff shortages cannot be used as an excuse to reduce the number of Beat Officers. No matter what the operational constraints are, the Kerala police should not reduce the number of Beat Officers assigned to a JSP. To do so, will compromise the very structure of how and why JSPs work. Therefore, the Kerala police must staff the existing JSPs adequately.

**Specify women representation on Janamaithri Samithis:** As effective and inclusive as Samithis may be, the lack of gender parity on a number of Committees is troubling. It is not sufficient to simply call for proportionate representation. Steps must be undertaken to ensure that women have an equal voice in the JSPs.

**Do not overextend Beat Officers:** With community members approaching Beat Officers to deal with issues that have little or no connection to crime control, there is a risk that Beat Officers will be overextended. For instance, some communities have approached Beat Officers for assistance with the construction of roads. The Kerala police leadership needs to be careful that its “net” is not cast so wide that such interventions deviate too much from the primary objective of policing, securing public safety. While building a road may help to establish a good relationship between the public and the police, such tangential activities should not be indefinitely encouraged.

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* Interview with Ramachandran, Sub Inspector, Kerala police.
5.1 Background

The Maldives is a former British protectorate that achieved its independence in 1965. While originally a sultanate, the country became a republic in 1968. Under colonial rule, a police force was first established by law in 1933 but then subsequently disbanded. It was re-established only in 1972 as part of the National Security Service (NSS) and until 2004 the police functioned as a paramilitary force. Unlike other nations in the Commonwealth, the Maldives did not have police legislation at independence in 1965.

President Ibrahim Nasir initially governed the country as a republic. In the midst of the political upheaval during the 1970s, President Nasir fled to Singapore in 1978. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom took over as President in 1978. He ruled over the Maldives from 1978 to 2008 with an iron fist. President Gayoom’s rule of the Maldives was marked by both praise and criticism. On the one hand, he was praised for developing the tourism industry. This raised the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Maldives to a level substantially higher than its South Asian neighbours. However, on the other hand, he was vociferously criticised for ruling as an autocrat. In particular, he was accused of stifling political opposition and perpetrating torture and rights abuses, going as far as giving orders to unilaterally detain his political opponents.

Gayoom’s rule was significantly challenged after the National Security Service (NSS) beat an imprisoned drug offender, Hassan Evan Naseem, to death in Maafushi Prison in September 2003. The excessive abuse of state power precipitated widespread dissent. Several people in the Maldives point to this event as the turning point in the political development of the country. Despite his use of detention and torture to intimidate political opponents, Gayoom was compelled to liberalise the Maldivian polity from 2004 to 2008.

In September 2004, the Maldives Police Service (MPS) was created as a civilian law enforcing body under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The fact that it was named a service as opposed to a force was to highlight the fact that the police were meant to provide a service to the public and not act as a force upon them. It was hoped that this would encourage people to accept the new police as their protectors. The name was actually designed to increase that acceptance and encourage the goal of community policing.

Following its formation, in March 2006, President Gayoom proposed the “Road Map for Reform Agenda”. It was an attempt to democratise all the major institutions of governance in the Maldives. It involved the creation of a new Constitution, new structures of government and revamping of the police and judiciary. This extensive overhaul radically transformed the way the government operated in the Maldives thereafter.

In August 2008, the new Constitution and Police Act were passed. Together, these two provided a strong framework for the rule of law that was earlier absent in the Maldives. As an example of the new MPS mindset, the police developed a Strategic Plan for 2007-2011 which charted out a five-year plan for reorganisation

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56 CHRI interviews of civil society in Malé, Maldives, 1-3 May 2009.
and reform. It emphasised on community policing and the need to "build and sustain public trust and confidence in the police". This is clearly reflected in the desired outcomes of the Plan which were:

- To ensure lawful behaviour and community safety
- To deal with and apprehend offenders in accordance with the law
- To provide professional and responsive services
- To achieve good governance.

However, building trust does not come about simply because certain laws are passed or strategies formulated. "Trust has to be nurtured with a clear vision and a pragmatic strategy in compliance with the rights, duties, and responsibilities stated in the Police Act and the Constitution. Together with the Citizens' Rights Chapter in the Constitution, a check and balance system for effective policing was enabled." An example of this is the introduction and strengthening of the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) as an independent oversight body overseeing the functioning of the police. Evidence of the PIC's independent scrutiny of the MPS became apparent when it held that the MPS was negligent when it cordoned off the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) on the morning of 2 August 2010, preventing JSC staff from working or entering the building.

The first Strategic Plan was practically discarded and by the end of 2010 a new plan for 2011-2013 was introduced. Again, a community-oriented approach of policing which was an integral component of the larger democratic reforms that the Maldives embarked on in 2003 formed an important component of the second Plan document.

The MPS also undertook a massive internal reorganisation. It established several internal structures such as the Professional Standards Directorate mandated to promote police compliance with the highest ethical and human rights standards. It developed 16 specialised departments including a Community Engagement and Crime Prevention Department, Custodial Department, Drug Enforcement Department, Forensics Department, Serious and Organised Crime Department among others. It also underwent a critical structural change in January 2010. The transformation saw the appointment of three Deputy Commissioners unlike the traditional structure that had a single Deputy Commissioner. The structural change also brought with it an expansion in the number of other Senior Commissioned Officers.

On 7 February 2012 President Nasheed was forced to step down. The President's resignation came after elements of the police and 60 to 70 officers from the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) sided with opposition protesters and attacked the MNDF headquarters. Nasheed's government was undergoing a crisis since 2010. Less than a year into his Presidency, cabinet members representing other political parties in the coalition began to resign in protest to an alleged lack of respect for transparency and the Constitution. Protests became a frequent occurrence in Malé after the President's coalition slowly dissolved. In December 2011, the capital city saw major opposition protests against Nasheed and his government. Former cabinet minister Mohamed Jameel Ahmed was repeatedly summoned to the police station in connection with the protests and even detained. Orders for his release by the Chief Justice were ignored. According to the police, Judge Abdulla Mohamed's non-compliance with their on-going investigations against him led in turn to his being arrested by members of the Maldives National Defence Force.

Owing to the arrest of the judge the opposition parties' protests gained momentum and they demanded Judge Abdulla Mohamed's immediate release. The opposition's protest at Republic Square lasted 22 days. On 6 February 2012, the Maldives Police Service declined to use force to control or disperse the protests, and instead joined them. Military forces increasingly joined the opposition, and Nasheed had to step down. Vice President Mohammed Waheed Hassan was then sworn in as the new President.

Clearly, the police played an inexplicably outrageous role in engineering the ouster and bringing down the country's first democratically elected government. The use of force by the police during the coup and

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82 Maldives Police Service (2010), Inception Report, p. 5.
the abuses committed by them were in excess of their powers. Inquiries to examine their excesses were instituted but there is not much hope for an impartial and independent probe.

Abdulla Riyaz was appointed Police Commissioner following the change of government on February 7 following the police and military-led coup.

If nothing else, this event and the developments in its aftermath indicate the extreme politicisation of the police in Maldives. Whilst Abdulla Riyaz claims that there is no politicisation in the police any longer, he also admits that for the last three years, the organisation was heavily influenced by politicians. In the wake of such extreme politicisation the fate of any community policing initiative is uncertain. An important feature of community policing is the neutrality of the police and the assurance that they work without political pressures.

This chapter analyses community policing practised in Maldives. The recent coup and its aftermath does not enter the evaluation of the initiative save only to say that it has a large overall bearing on any policing or reform initiative within the country.

5.2 Case Study: Maldives Police Service

The Maldives Police Service’s (MPS) mission statement generally reflects a healthy, community-oriented approach to policing. “In partnership with the community, create a safer and more secure Maldives for all by building sustainable quality police services.” To achieve this objective, the MPS Strategic Plan for 2007-2011 explicitly identified community policing as an important element to establishing democratic policing in the Maldives. The MPS Strategic Plan seeks to “instil the community policing philosophy throughout MPS and to promote organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions which give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime by embracing the philosophy of Community Policing and to work proactively to develop solutions to the immediate underlying conditions contributing to public safety problems.”

The major expected outputs of the community policing approach are:

1. Awareness of the management of the philosophy of community policing
2. Aligning all trainings given to police officers on community policing
3. Alignment of departmental procedures regarding community policing
4. Crime prevention through community policing
5. Engagement with the community through sports and art
6. Study the practicality of mobile posts
7. Establishment of centres and infrastructure geared towards community policing.

The MPS is specifically aiming to avoid the traditional “command and control” approach that many law enforcement agencies in South Asia use, and focus more on developing partnerships with the community to resolve problems in collaboration with them. With drug-related issues being a priority, it is believed that a more community-oriented approach would have greater effect than traditional policing in resolving this serious problem.

The MPS approach to community policing is based on “partnership policing”. Given the geographical characteristics of the Maldives with small island communities dispersed across 20 atolls, there are significant challenges facing the MPS. Presently, in addition to a police station in every atoll, islands with populations exceeding 2,000 people also have a police station.

A key objective of the Maldives police was the creation of safer communities and a reduction in the vulnerability of people to drug offences and juvenile crimes and terrorism. To achieve this, the Maldives police identified two key aspects. The first was to build closer ties with the community to allow for better reporting of offences and collection of information. This, they believed, would lead to quicker intelligence on criminal activities and help the police to respond rapidly. The second aspect was developing the skills and capacity of the police to better

understand social issues and identify key trends in crime. Their priorities were crimes related to drug offences and juvenile crimes. With over 45 per cent of the population aged 18 years and under, the Juvenile Justice project sought to position the Maldives Police Service to focus and address these issues appropriately.

The key strategies to achieve police-public trust were twofold. One approach was to establish Crime Prevention Committees (CPCs) in the atoll communities, and the other was to launch the “Together We Can Fight Crime” campaign to raise awareness and knowledge within the community on crime prevention. With respect to CPCs, there are supposed to be 84 committees across the country intended to work proactively with the MPS. CPCs are meant to create a platform for the community and police to come together. Members include people from different segments of the community, including schools, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business enterprises.

Some communities have welcomed the CPC initiative because there were encouraging results in crime prevention, particularly in illegal drug-related offences. While some CPCs are more successful and proactive than others, the majority are rather inactive. The CPCs particularly need to be more vigilant to protect communities from domestic violence and sexual molestation of children by creating awareness on social responsibilities of citizens.  

With respect to the “Together We Can Fight Crime” programme, it is essentially an awareness programme aimed at the police officers and communities in the atolls. Workshops are organised for selected people from various islands within the atoll with the twin agenda of raising awareness about certain types of criminal activities and identifying the main problems that exist in their community. At the same time the programmes intend to gain support from the public on the issue of crime prevention. Citizens' role in crime prevention and how they can provide support to the police are detailed throughout the workshops.

Awareness sessions are held at schools for the community and the media. First, sessions are held at schools to enhance the understanding of students, teachers and parents on criminal activities and to gain their support in crime prevention. Religious lectures directed at parents are meant to offer advice on bringing up children in accordance with moderate principles of Islam, dissuading the concept of extremism/extremity in religion. Areas of focus, based on the frequency and severity of crime, included bullying, drugs and child abuse. These programmes have been held in five schools in Malé and 43 schools in the atolls.  

Second, awareness programmes are held for the community. Specifically, the police interact with NGOs, the youth, government offices and drivers. The areas of focus include: drugs, child abuse, road safety and safety on the seas. To date, 11 atolls have been covered.  

Third, the media programme includes a radio programme every Thursday night on Raajje FM and one on Friday Night with DhiFM. In addition, TV programmes are also used, as are video clips, billboards and leaflets.  

To forge better relations with the community in Malé and the atolls, especially so that gang activity can be reduced, the MPS involved the local youth, and even gangs themselves, in sports events with the police. “Football matches and other such sporting events have proven to be effective tools in building trust and respect between law enforcement officials and local youth. An excellent example of this approach is Gnyavayani Fuvamullah in the south of the Maldives, which until recently was notorious for its gang activities. A concerted community policing approach aimed at engaging, rather than alienating the youth, is largely credited for the recent fall in gang-related criminal activity on the island.” Acknowledging the importance of making citizens feel included rather than estranged is a positive step taken towards successful crime reduction.

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96 Presentation of MPS at CHR-IDN Capacity Building Workshop, Malé, 14 July 2010, “Community Policing & Crime Prevention in the Maldives”.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
5.3 Assessment

5.3.1 Philosophy
Relative to most other police organisations in South Asia, the MPS has a tremendous advantage of having been newly constituted in 2004. As a result, it has been able to put in place new processes and procedures, including the development of a Strategic Plan for 2007-2011 and 2011-2013 and a Business Plan for 2010. The "clean slate" provided to the MPS in 2004 permitted the organisation to chart out a more public-friendly approach to policing. By all accounts, the MPS behaves in a more humane and democratic manner than law enforcement agencies did before 2004.\(^{100}\)

Consequently, the philosophy of the MPS is quite conducive to community policing. With a focus on building and sustaining public trust and confidence in the police, community policing affords the MPS an opportunity to do exactly that.\(^{101}\) However, a shortcoming is that a baseline survey on public perception of the MPS, or the relative merits of community policing, was not conducted at the beginning of MPS's reorganisation efforts in 2008. Thus, any movement towards community policing and its success will be difficult to assess, since there is no baseline data to compare against. That is why the MPS should carry out such a survey as soon as possible.

In light of their achievements, one must not be impatient or hasty in deeming them unsuccessful. In the Maldives, reforms are being introduced that take hundreds of years to implement in other nations, such as the UK.\(^{102}\) Despite having a probable need for greater restructuring, the task is not one that can be performed overnight. The community must, thus, also be aware of this. Expecting an immediate transition is harbouring unfair and highly unlikely expectations of the police. Ahmed Irfan, of the Maldivian Detainee Network reaffirms this claim, arguing: "Community policing overtures are sometimes misread by the local populace – clearly there is a learning curve, which needs to be negotiated by both sides in successfully implementing this concept".\(^{103}\)

As mentioned earlier, the widespread contour of the island poses a hindrance for successful implementation. Akin to other nations in South Asia such as India, this inhibiting facet of pocketed implementation of initiatives versus the adoption of the philosophy as a wholesome national goal greatly influences the efficacy of community policing. By focusing on crime "hotspots" the scope and effectiveness of the overall approach is constrained.\(^{104}\)

5.3.2 Strategy
The use of both a Strategic Plan as well as a Business Plan has definitely aided the MPS in charting out a course of action to improve the delivery of police services. For instance, the Business Plan for 2010 details several priorities and associated benchmarks.

One strategy of the Business Plan that was outlined was to strengthen the functioning of existing crime prevention committees and establish new committees. It was hoped that the outcomes would be:

- Improved partnership in crime prevention
- Improved trust and confidence in the police
- Reduced crime and improved safety of the people
- Improved public perception of the police.

Targets for these outcomes were laid out. A survey to gauge people's trust and confidence in the police was to be conducted in six islands. By the second year of the Plan it was hoped that public satisfaction would rise by at least 20 per cent. Establishment of a CPC in every island with a police station was expected to be achieved by the second quarter of the Plan with a liaison officer in each atoll. These targets were to be achieved by April 2010.

Unfortunately, the problem with the MPS is its failure to match its performance against stated objectives. The

\(^{100}\) CHRI interviews with civil society in Malé, Maldives, 1-3 May 2009; CHRI interviews with civil society in Malé, Maldives, 12-14 July 2010.
Home Minister reaffirmed this by acknowledging that the last police Strategic Plan was not fully successful in meeting its aims.\textsuperscript{165} The first Plan document was discarded and a second Plan formulated for 2011-2013. Neither was an assessment on the implementation of the Plan carried out, nor of its successes and failures.

As indicated in the Plan, a survey of community policing needs was to be carried out by June 2011. Unfortunately neither a needs assessment nor a public satisfaction survey has been undertaken till date.

Nevertheless, the MPS was still able to achieve some reform, even if its performance on community policing is still at a nascent stage.

5.3.3 Tactics

A key desired outcome of any community policing initiative is a reduction in crime. To assess this, a baseline survey and crime mapping exercise needs to be done before launching this effort. A major weakness of the initiative was the absence of any crime mapping. One of the main concerns regarding police response to crime was the lack of needs-assessment survey that could help measure the police’s requirements to tackle crime rates and patterns across the atolls.

The stated intention of creating CPCs across the Maldives is a step in the right direction. The CPCs are set up in most islands but are inactive or unable to function objectively in the smaller islands, in particular, as close community links are believed to colour their functioning. To address these difficulties, CPCs require guidelines and a code of conduct which are yet to be formulated.

Training and capacity building within the MPS remains a challenge. Police officers are unable to respond sensitively to victims of child abuse or drug offences. This is attributed to various factors including lack of knowledge on the law and procedures, misunderstanding the role of the police and insufficient understanding of the sociological roots of particular crimes.\textsuperscript{167}

The concept underlying “Together We Can Fight Crime” is well intentioned. But the level of open dialogue with the community to assist in the development and refinement of such programmes could be improved. The MPS can engage in more consultations with the public, particularly in the often ignored outlying islands, to craft a collaborative approach to problem solving on various law and order issues.

Distrust of the police remains high in the community. An independent survey carried out jointly by two NGOs — MDN and CHRI — showed that the police’s efforts to reach out to the people did not have any substantial impact. A majority of the community respondents thought that not much had changed about the police. About 34 per cent said that they were as unfriendly and unhelpful as earlier, while 33 per cent stated that there was no improvement in their response time or efficiency and 31 per cent observed that corruption levels in the police were as high as ever. If building public trust was a major objective of the Plan, the police did not fair well. Half (50 per cent) the community respondents were still reluctant to approach the police owing to fear and a lack of confidence. A staggering 73 per cent mentioned that the police needed to do more by way of engaging with the community.

Distrust of the police continues partially owing to its past image. As part of the NSS, police action was feared and loathed by the people. Human rights violations were rampant, and since several of the senior police officers are from the same background, it adds to the trust deficit. But public distrust continues also because of the lack of sincerity with which community outreach programmes were carried out and an inadequate capacity and understanding of the goals and principles of the Plan.


\textsuperscript{166} The period of five years was taken as a reference point to coincide with the Strategic Plan period.

The failure of outreach programmes can be attributed to several reasons. The general sense is that most of the police's efforts are focused on the capital island of Malé. Information about police rules and outreach programmes is disseminated through the police website. With internet access being limited, this information is not available to large sections of the population. Another drawback is the failure to reach out to migrants, mostly from Bangladesh, who are largely illiterate and only barely conversant with Dhivehi. Crime by and within the migrant community is emerging as a major concern in the country. Strangely though, this issue does not find focus even in the police's new Strategic Plan.

However, the MPS will need to improve their fiscal allocation, injecting more funds into community policing. Part of the problem lies in the fact that there is considerable uncertainty surrounding their overall budget that was allocated in the Majlis-approved National Budget for 2011.\textsuperscript{108}

5.3.4 Organisation
With a relatively new and small police force in place, there is a tremendous opportunity for the MPS leadership to push the importance of community policing to the forefront of the law and order agenda. With drug trafficking and abuse at an all-time high,\textsuperscript{109} and traditional "command and control" methods proving ineffective, community policing may be the way to forge important partnerships and build trust which could help reduce such crimes. But a stronger effort by the MPS leadership is required to make that happen. In the absence of such leadership, decentralised decision-making and other important organisational changes to facilitate the strengthening of community policing, this will not occur.

5.4 Recommendations
Amend the Police Act, 2008 to make community policing a statutory obligation: A significant omission in the Maldives Police Act is the requirement of community policing. This impedes the development of good policing and signals an unfortunate ambiguity of commitment in improving the service in a significant way.

Police leadership to make community policing a priority: With so many different strategies and plans in place, MPS police leadership should make actual implementation of community policing a priority.

Strengthen the functioning of existing crime prevention committees and establish new CPCs: With public collaboration being the key to developing the trust required for community policing to succeed, robust and effective CPCs are essential. To date, however, their implementation has been ad hoc.

Develop CPCs so that they properly address the challenge of geographic dispersion: Any community policing model has to take into account the fact that there is a transient population in Malé and a significant number of Maldivians living in remote islands. The CPCs should function and operate in a manner that accommodates this diversity.

Conduct regular needs-assessment and public satisfaction surveys: To understand and address community needs effectively, it is vital that the police constantly review crime patterns and social concerns across the various atolls and allocate resources accordingly. A thorough needs-assessment should include a baseline study of the state of policing; a focus on the public's perception of the police, and the needs and demands of communities.

Give priority to evaluation and performance monitoring: Present community policing initiatives suffer from a lack of periodic evaluations. A regular assessment of the progress of projects and their outcomes and impact are essential for the success of any plan. The understanding gained from such evaluations will help refine subsequent plans.

Enhance emphasis on police training: Police training needs to take account of changing policing needs. Equal emphasis needs to be placed on inter-personal communication skills, stress management and personal attitudes and prejudices. Such training is an important measure to enhance positive attitudes and healthy behaviour, which in turn will help improve police public ties.
Educate the public about the opportunities and limitation of community policing: The public may expect immediate arrests following complaints, or instant information regarding police plans or investigations. The value and limitations of community policing must be explained to them by the MPS. This means that there should be open and constant dialogue between the MPS and the public, which has not necessarily been the case to date.
6.1 Background

Analogous to the other colonies under British Rule, Pakistan's police is less a service and more a force. The Police Act, 1861 (the “Act”) remained applicable in Pakistan as a central law guiding policing in Pakistan. The Act was replaced with the centrally promulgated Police Order, 2002 (the “Order”) which came into effect on 14 August 2002. However, notwithstanding the introduction of the Order, no new rules for its implementation were ever formulated. The Order sought to provide the police with operational autonomy and freedom from illegitimate political interference. More importantly, the Order envisaged greater accountability of the police to external institutions. However, subsequent amendments made to the Order diluted the operational autonomy of the police and rendered the external bodies ineffective and dependent on the government of the day. In addition, implementation of the Order was challenging because provincial governments were not properly consulted during its formulation and civil bureaucracies never accepted the new dispensation. Although police organisations throughout the country continue to adhere to the Police Order, 2002, some provincial governments are seriously considering amending it.

As with other colonies of the British Raj, Pakistan's police have typically adopted a top-down model and avoided implementing a more community-oriented form of law enforcement. Pakistan's experiments to improve its policing are similar to the experiences of its Indian counterparts. For example, Pakistan is also a federal state with a general understanding and consensus that police legislation is a provincial subject and it is at the provincial level that legislation on police needs to be passed. This explains why the entire budget of provincial police establishments is borne by the provinces. 110 In addition, as in India, past attempts to reform the Pakistan police were made by various administrations. However, none of the efforts resulted in the police actually adopting a public-friendly approach.111

Footprints of community policing schemes are present in Pakistan. With the formation of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) in 1998 the term community policing entered the mainstream. Originally set up to combat the kidnapping of businessmen in Karachi, the organisation has come to be regarded as a 'hybrid' arrangement for the provision of public service.112

In 2002, with the introduction of the Police Order, community policing became a statutory obligation. The Order empowered the government to establish Citizen-Police Liaison Committees (CPLC) as "voluntary, self-financing and autonomous bodies" so that they may help build the capacity of National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) and Provincial Public Safety [and Police Complaints] Commissions (PSPCCs), serve as a liaison between aggrieved citizens and the police, and provide assistance to the commissions and the federal PCA. While the district CPLCs were established in Lahore, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Peshawar, Karachi and

111 For an overview of the history of police reform efforts in Pakistan, please see Chapter 5 of Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed – Moving From Force to Service in South Asian Policing (2010), Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.
Quetta, over 125 more are still to be created in the other districts of Pakistan. Although it incorporates a strong legal basis to advance community policing, nine years after its promulgation, institutionalisation remains incomplete.\footnote{Centre for Peace and Developmental Issues (CPDI), Proceedings of a Consultative Workshop on Community Policing (Islamabad 2010).} It is apparent that in the absence of legislation, implementation is impossible. Despite Pakistan’s enacted order and pocketed initiatives, the country fails to reap the successes of community policing.

Even though several attempts at community policing initiatives have been made, akin to those in India, none of them have resulted in the police actually adopting a public-friendly approach.\footnote{Feudal Forces, Reform Delayed – Moving From Force to Service in South Asian Policing (2010), Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.}

This chapter will not discuss all community policing experiments undertaken by individual police officers or in collaboration with different NGOs. The scope of this chapter will be limited to examining notable experiments that provide some instruction on what tactics or approaches should be avoided and then delve more deeply into the CPLC experiment in Karachi.

### 6.1.1 Musalihat Anjuman (MA)

As a result of the lapses in safeguards provided by the formal justice system, attempts at Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) via the community have gained momentum over the past decade. The Local Government Order (LGO) of 2001 is exemplary in providing the mediums for ADRs. The Musalihat Anjuman was formed under the Local Government Ordinance 2001. The LGO set out “rules of business” for the MA to follow. The provincial governments began vetting these laws in 2005 in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab.\footnote{Local Government Order (2001) and Rules of Business for Musalihat Anjumans.}

The formal MA has statutory sanction as provided in the law. The LGO, which provides a statutory basis for the MA, is currently being challenged and will either be dismantled or severely amended.\footnote{Telephonic Interview with Mr. Mukhtar Ali, Executive Director, Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI).} Thus, the MA, despite having a theoretical provision, is not sustainable or wholly implemented, as the government refuses to take ownership for such laws.

#### 6.1.2 Musalihat Committees

To secure a greater bonding between communities and police the Community Policing Pilot was launched in NWFP through a Standing Order institutionalising Musalihat Committees in 2008. The Musalihat Committee in NWFP was established independent of the Musalihat Anjuman, as provided under the Local Government Ordinance 2001.\footnote{Centre for Peace and Developmental Issues (CPDI), Proceedings of a Consultative Workshop on Community Policing (Islamabad 2010), p. 157: Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman, Case Study of Delivering Justice at the Doorsteps by Mr. Hamid Afridi, National Project Manager GTZ/UNDP.} Particular care was exercised to ensure that the formation and working of Musalihat Committees in NWFP is kept completely apolitical. This initiative was originally started in Hazara but later extended to other districts of the province.

The focus of this initiative is to reduce the number of cases registered by the police. With the committees acting as mediators the affected parties are counselled to come to an amicable settlement of the disputes. It is on the basis of these facts, that the initiative was replicated in other districts.

A recent workshop held by the Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI) revealed moderate success by the Musalihat Committees. The report states that “it is instrumental in reducing the pressure and backlog on the police and court systems.”\footnote{Telephonic Interview with Mr. Mukhtar Ali (Executive Director Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI).} The MA provides methods of ADR which save citizens a considerable amount of time and money; the resolutions provided by them are also efficient, fair and acceptable. Community Policing “is provided in a ‘piece-meal’ manner”, but in the absence of a clear mandate its progress and sustainability is in dispute. Legislation should provide a “coherent, homogenous, unanimous law” for community policing.\footnote{According to Mr. Malik Naveed Khan, IGP NWFP the Musalihat Anjumans were not as effective as the Musalihat Committee which was established under the aegis of the police. The Anjumans were extremely politicised.} The success of this project is apparent, however, the practical absence of these committees and the highly politicised shadow in which they function pose major curtailting factors.
6.1.2 Community Policing Officers (CPO) and Special Police Officers (SPO)
In an interview with ChR, Sarmad Saeed Khan, an officer with the Punjab Police, furnished his understanding of community policing in Pakistan. His knowledge stemmed from multiple community policing experiments conducted in a few districts. He wrote a well-argued paper, which comprised his personal experiences with various pocketed, successful initiatives that were adopted, and explored factors for the overall failure of community policing.

According to him, despite the success of individual schemes, the lack of sustainability was the deflating factor. “All the programmes initiated by me were executed very successfully, but, unfortunately, they were orphaned due to my transfer. My successors failed to adopt my revolutionary concepts.” In the districts of Sheikhupura and Rahimyar Khan, Mr Khan initiated and carried out several community policing initiatives. The creation of a Community Policing Committee (CPC) and the appointment of Community Police Officers saw a hint of success in building relations with the people. However, the initiative, like most others lacked teeth and was thus unsustainable.

While the various implementations saw minor success, some of them were unquestionably unconstitutional. The introduction of Special Police Officers, for example, is considered a vital and successful Community Policing initiative by Mr Khan. However, providing legal sanction and armed weapons to commoners is not wise nor is it constitutional in other countries. The heavy political influence coupled with the lack of oversight makes these Special Police Officers more of a liability than an asset. The law sanctions provisions for them which are equivocal and can easily be manipulated to justify illicit behaviour. It is irresponsible to put armed weapons in the hands of citizens, the repercussions of which are often unconstitutional. Such initiatives have the potential of turning into a vigilante mode of community involvement in maintaining order, where non-police personnel are likely to take the law into their own hands. A judicious use of coercive policing authority by SPOs cannot be guaranteed and is likely to create civil and criminal liabilities for the police under whose aegis they act. In addition, it is doubtful if non-specialised persons can fulfil the police’s mandate to protect the life, liberty and property of the population. There have been too many recent instances of misuse and abuse of police powers by SPOs appointed in haste for this to be accepted as a community policing initiative. The recent Salwa Judum verdict in India (2011) reaffirmed the outrageous acts of militancy that emerge through such vigilante groups and deemed them unconstitutional and illicit.

The Inspector General of Police (IGP) alludes to the Special Police Officers as a beneficial group. He stated that “it sent a strong message to the Taliban regarding morale of the communities in the affected areas and augmented morale of police as force.” He also advocated that such a force would give strength and self-confidence to the common people. It is this facet of confidence which is forbidding to an onlooker. With provisions of impunity under the penal code, these commoners become indestructible. The backdrop of years of frustration owing to negligent policing has propelled people in the direction of wanting to bring about change themselves. Adopting methods of armed vigilance is however not the remedy.

6.2 Case Study: Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC)
The concept of community policing in Pakistan was introduced in 1989, when criminals kidnapped businessmen or their relatives for ransom against their release, while the victims did not receive any proper recourse from the police. Realising that the police did not have the capacity or the resources to deal with the kidnappers without the participation of community, the former Governor of the Province of Sindh, Justice (Retd) Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, approached the businessmen and industrialists who were the main targets of the crime with the concept of establishing Citizen-Police Liaison Committees (CPLC). Responding to the highly volatile situation in the city of Karachi, with businessmen/industrialists kidnapped almost every day for ransom, the CPLC played the dual role of providing solace to the victims’ families and technical support and guidance to the police to deal with the situation.

Often the CPLC is the first point of contact when a kidnapping occurs in Karachi. In fact, it is believed that 50 per cent of the kidnappings in Karachi are solved with the CPLC’s assistance whereas the remaining cases are resolved after a ransom is paid.

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120 Centre for Peace and Developmental Initiatives (CPDI), Proceedings of a Consultative Workshop on Community Policing (Islamabad 2010).
Besides professionally dealing with kidnapping, murder, extortion, dacoities and cases of terrorism, CPLC Karachi also maintains data on all crimes that took place during the last twenty years in a customized state-of-the-art database of stolen/smashed vehicles, mobile phones and Geographic Information System based Spatial Crime Analysis. Regular crime patterns are discovered and shared with the police on a monthly basis to combat crime. Data on all prisoners lodged in Karachi jails is also maintained at CPLC.

The CPLC in Karachi has 55 members and the CPLC in Sindh and has a two-tier structure:

1. **A Zonal Reporting Cell (ZRC)** is the information storehouse and supervised by the Chief of the CPLC. The staff includes controllers, data processing officers and computer operators. Police officers of the rank of sub-inspectors and assistant sub-inspectors also sit at the ZRC. Of these, the Police Complaints Officer has the powers to register an FIR in case any police station has refused to register it. He is also empowered to handle any complaint against a police officer. A second police officer functions as a radio operator whose job is to keep the CPLC connected to all police communications taking place on the radio or wireless.

2. **District Reporting Cells (DRC)** are positioned in the office of every district Superintendent of Police in Karachi. DRCs carry out three primary functions:
   
i. Collect all crime information and pass it to the CRC for collation and analysis
   
ii. Liaise with local police officials
   
iii. Provide aid to victims of crime.

Every DRC has a Chief and Deputy Chief who are CPLC members, along with other members attached to it.
The notified functions of the CPLC are to:

- Help ensure that FIRs are duly registered and that no FIR/Complaint is refused.
- Find out if the investigation officers in the cases assigned to them are adopting dilatory tactics.
- Develop and maintain databases of crime, prisoners and stolen vehicles.
- Collect statistics of various kinds of cases registered and disposed during a specified period.
- Find out if any persons(s) is unlawfully detained at a police station and take necessary steps for the release of such person(s) in accordance with law.
- Assist the police in taking steps to preserve peace and prevent or detect crimes.
- Assist citizens in removing gambling or prostitution dens or any other unauthorised/illegal business that is being carried out in the area.
- Report acts of misconduct or negligence of duty by any police officer.
- Look into the working conditions of police stations and suggest measures for their improvement.
- Create confidence, remove misunderstanding and reduce the credibility gap between the police and the public.
- Ensure full cooperation of the members of the public in the performance of their duty by police officials.
- Apprise the SHO of a police station of the genuine grievances of members of the public/residents of the area, with a view to looking into the causes and suggesting remedial measures.
- Look into the welfare aspects of police personnel and initiate measures to improve them.
- Bring to focus the exceptional work done by the police and make recommendations for suitable reward for all such exemplary work.
- Ensure that the Traffic Police is performing its duties diligently and efficiently, and take steps for smooth operations/betterment of traffic control.
- Supervise, initiate, handle projects or schemes for the security/betterment of the citizens by improving the conditions of the area, district, division, city or province, through schemes such as Charged Parking, Neighbourhood Care, Central Vehicle Pool (CVP).
- Assist the police as members of inquiry committees in cases pertaining to misconduct/corruption/deliberation of duty, etc. by police officers.

- Do all such things as are necessary, incidental or conducive to any of the objects stated above.
- Assist the Social Welfare Department in managing and streamlining the affairs of DarulAman and DarulAfaq.
- Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the government periodically.

The list of notified functions reflects the extensive scope of duties performed by the CPLC. Since its inception in 1950, the CPLC has increasingly sought ways to improve the delivery of policing services to the population of Karachi. It has essentially played a crucial role in improving the shortcomings of the police as a law enforcement agency by providing critical inputs into law enforcement. For instance, it put together a computer program that has consolidated key information of 20.5 million vehicles in the Karachi area. In the event that the police require vehicle-related information held in the database, they contact the CPLC who can quickly provide such information.

Though the CPLC also has an oversight role over the police it has stayed away from this function. In practice the main support functions of the CPLC in operational policing has remained concentrated on:

i. **Information gathering** by maintaining a database of all registered and stolen vehicles as well as a comprehensive database of every crime registered in every police station of Karachi.

ii. **Information analysis** of crime data, generating a monthly crime analysis for the police for them to plan for crime prevention.

iii. **Involvement in police functions**, whereby CPLC members play an active role in police operations, especially against kidnappers, by tracking down all communications regarding a kidnapping.

iv. **Aid to citizens** whereby CPLC assists people to register FIRs and helps get information regarding stolen property, etc.

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123 It is interesting to note that the police can only review this information held by the CPLC and cannot add or subtract to this database.
Clearly CPLC has to a large extent taken over the role of the police where it comes to providing services.

**Neighbourhood Care (NC) Centres**

Additionally, CPLC Karachi has also initiated several Neighbourhood Care initiatives/projects (CPLC-NC) in five areas of Karachi. These projects cover a wide range of activities in the areas where they operate, including security, surveillance through cameras, sanitation facilities, lighting in the localities and traffic management.

With the introduction of CPLC-NC projects the crime rate in these areas has declined and the residents of the area now feel secure owing to round-the-clock patrolling and the presence of police personnel. Similarly, the provision of civic amenities in these areas has been improved to a considerable extent with excellent support to the relevant agencies.\(^1\)

NC Centres are financed and managed by local residents. Each NC Centre has 12 committee members. NC Centres are seen as beneficial because the committees provide the police with vehicles, drivers, fuel and vehicle maintenance. As a result, this frees up assets for the police to use elsewhere. However, the critique is that this essentially makes the police a private force for hire in affluent locations.\(^2\)

### 6.3 Assessment

#### 6.3.1 Philosophy

The CPLC was originally based along the lines of the Neighbourhood Watch committees that acted as eyes and ears for the police. However, it has failed to retain that character. It stands today as a dominant, influential and well-resourced body providing a critical service that enables the police to carry out its law enforcement functions.

It is indeed a unique initiative, different from any other implemented in Pakistan’s neighbouring nations, as it is not police-driven but is propelled by citizens. Statistics reflect that a majority of the financial cost is borne by the CPLC members with the government only contributing a maximum of 20 per cent. With such a minuscule contribution it is unclear what role the government would play in setting policy, what control the government would have over decisions, and most importantly, would such a costly initiative be able to sustain itself if the funds/contributions/donations brought in by the CPLC members were unavailable. Such an initiative also blurs the boundaries between public and private, whereby private actors become so entrenched in providing what are essentially government services.

Without negating its important role in providing the police with an entire crime and information database, the CPLC cannot be categorised as a community policing initiative. Keeping in view the fundamental elements of any community policing initiative, the CPLC does not have the traditional beat and patrol requirements; there is no interaction between the police and the public at large at a local level; the focus on crime reduction, crime tracking and crime mapping is on crimes of a higher level (kidnapping and car theft) and not the traditional soft crimes that communities would associate or relate to. The decline in crime rate is not necessarily a result of community interaction but owing to the high level of intelligence and information gathering with the use of state-of-the-art technology.

Further, it would be difficult to say whether public confidence in policing as a result of the CPLC initiative has increased. A recent report by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), where 129 police stations across the country were monitored, demonstrated that not much had changed in relation to public satisfaction with the police. The report showed that there was no significant change of public confidence in the police or in policing attitudes. People who approached police stations reported abuse of authority and graft, which dented public trust in the law enforcers. A large number of complainants reported that police stations did not provide services; perhaps due to low, and in some cases non-existent, official oversight mechanisms. The report also stated that there were frequent complaints that staff at the police stations sought monetary or non-monetary benefits for registering FIRs.
A core function of the CPLC is to build public trust. CPLCs do claim that they have been able to bring the public closer to the police. Unfortunately there are no statistics in the form of a survey (both baseline and post-initiative) to back this claim. Popular sentiment in Karachi also proves otherwise. Thus it is difficult to state that CPLCs have been instrumental in bridging the police-public divide.

The CPLC initiated its Neighbourhood Care project with the purpose of providing security and civic amenities to the residents in parts of Karachi. This is a joint venture between citizens and the police to provide greater security to affluent neighbourhoods. Although the project has the backing of the Sindh government and the IG of Police, and some funding is provided by the public exchequer, a substantially large proportion of the expenses are borne by the residents of the neighbourhood through donations. To prevent the occurrence of crime in these neighbourhoods, several surveillance cameras have been installed. Patrol cars and motorcycles have been provided to police personnel for patrolling the area round the clock. In a bid to provide incentives to the police personnel assigned to duties in these areas, CPLC provides refreshments, shower facilities, a special daily allowance, medical facilities for them and their families, schooling facilities for their children and so on. Additionally, the CPLC has funded large-scale computerisation of police stations to maintain records of crimes (for vehicle and mobile phone thefts), criminals and prisoners, and has installed remote camera surveillance, in the name of providing improved safety and security for residents.

While this initiative may appear to be a progressive step in improving citizen-police cooperation aimed at enhancing the security of these affluent neighbourhoods, its continued operation poses basic contradictions with the law of the land. For example, the entire exercise places the neighbourhoods and residential areas that are not part of the scheme at an immediate disadvantage. In the absence of similar security systems in neighbourhoods where people cannot afford to make donations because of their socio-economic situations, a large part of the population is deprived of high quality services from the Sindh police. It is submitted that this amounts to discriminatory treatment of the less privileged neighbourhoods -- a clear violation of the guarantee of equality and equal treatment of every person by the law enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The State and its agencies cannot and must not discriminate between individuals or between sections of the population except for the purpose of providing special assistance to marginalised groups. This is a basic tenet of the rule of law in any democracy. In fact, if the Neighbourhood Care scheme is to meet the test of equality and non-discrimination, it must be extended to an equal number of families living in less affluent neighbourhoods.

Policing, i.e., the prevention and the investigation of crime is a State function. While it is essential for the maintenance of internal security, it is also a public service to which all citizens must have equal access. In a democracy, every citizen residing within the jurisdiction of the State is also a taxpayer (indirect or direct). The State undertakes to provide basic services whose expenses are paid for by the taxes raised from the citizenry. Police personnel are employed for the purpose of providing these services to every person and are remunerated from taxpayers' funds. If a public service provides services of enhanced quality to a segment of the population based on its paying capacity it amounts to unfair prejudice and bias by the State. This is unacceptable in a democracy.

Another argument may be advanced against the inherently discriminatory basis of the Neighbourhood Care project. The personnel employed by the project are essentially public servants. Only a limited number of personnel of the total pool of policemen and policewomen are employed in this project. It goes without saying that there will be intense competition to work in the Neighbourhood Care project as opposed to working in other areas. The State ends up discriminating amongst its own employees by choosing to remunerate some with enhanced perks and facilities while continuing to employ other similarly placed personnel in less attractive conditions. This is also a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, namely, equal treatment to one's own employees. The State cannot and must not support a system that discriminates between its employees.

Further, the Neighbourhood Care scheme though laudable in its intention, amounts to privatisation or outsourcing the sovereign function of policing in the name of providing essential services. Policing must always remain within the domain of State agencies and funded by the taxpayers who must contribute to its upkeep in equal measure (subject to the capacity of
each person to pay). While the lower level personnel are essentially employees of the State, the higher echelons managing the Neighbourhood Care project appear to be private citizens endowed with special powers. This creates a situation of uncertainty in terms of the liability of such bodies and actors for any human rights violations that may occur in the context of the implementation of the project. The State and its employees have an obligation to protect, promote and fulfil basic human rights and entitlements for all citizens. This obligation stems from the fact that Pakistan has ratified all key international human rights instruments that lay down the basic human rights standards. It is therefore duty bound to the international community and to its citizens to ensure basic human rights and entitlements to all citizens and persons residing within its jurisdiction. Private agencies, despite being within the jurisdiction of the State, only have an imperfect obligation as they have not undertaken to promote, protect and fulfil human rights as the State and its agencies have before any body. So any human rights violations committed in the course of the implementation of projects such as Neighbourhood Care can be dealt with as civil wrongs under tort law. The painstakingly developed human rights jurisprudence would not be applicable to such cases. Courts will have to find newer ways of holding private entities and actors liable for violations of human rights. This is highly undesirable as it places an undue burden on the victim to prove that the violations actually occurred. It reverses the burden of proof, which is an essential feature in any human rights litigation. In cases of torture in custody, illegal arrest and wrongful confinement by the police, it is the duty of the police to prove that such actions did not occur. The victim has to merely make an allegation on the basis of some evidence. However, if the victim has suffered due to some action or omission that is in the nature of a tort, the burden of proving such action or omission falls on him/her. Several helpless victims without the means to do so may simply not choose to approach courts to seek redress against private bodies and actors. The State would have failed in its constitutional obligation and fiduciary duty of ensuring the safety and security of each of its citizens.

6.4 Recommendations
The CPLC does not necessarily qualify as a community policing initiative, and so the recommendations are more of a general nature and not targeted to the present CPLC.

- Make community policing a statutory obligation as directed by the Police Order, 2002. The government was authorised to establish Citizen Police Liaison Committees (CPLCs) as voluntary, self-financing and autonomous bodies to develop, among other objectives, “a mechanism for liaison between aggrieved citizens and the police for providing relief”. The legislation failed to lay down the composition of such committees, the selection process of members and its mandate.

- Looking at best practice models from neighbouring jurisdictions, community policing within Pakistan should not remain ad hoc initiatives adopted by individual officers in select districts, it should be institutionalised across the country. Since policing is a provincial subject, institutionalisation means that every province must accept and adopt CPLCs. For greater success, pilot projects could be launched initially, rather than going full scale.

- Carry out public perception surveys as well as needs assessment surveys to gauge the trust deficit between the police and the public and understand the policing needs of different communities.

- The CPLC’s work of crime mapping and crime tracking is a valuable service. After taking a holistic account of the costs, feasibility and sustainability of such a project, attempts should be made to replicate it.

- Most of the funding for the CPLC initiative is borne by private individuals through donations and contributions. The government is known to contribute only 20 per cent of the CPLC’s running costs. This arrangement should change. Law enforcement is the government’s duty through the police. This cannot be privatised for risks which are too well known to be reiterated. Government contribution must form the bulk of the CPLC’s financial requirements.

- Successes, failures and weaknesses of the Musalihat Anjumans and Musalihat Committees need to be documented and lessons learnt from this should be incorporated into future activities.