Dear All,
I am happy to report on an example of good practice in the implementation of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Readers may remember the conflagration that engulfed many parts of Assam in July-August 2012. Several hundred thousand residents of villages and towns were forced to leave their homes and live in make-shift relief camps. The State Government of Assam requested the Central Government to deploy the armed forces to stem the tide of communal violence. The Chief Minister is also reported to have complained about the delay in the deployment of armed forces. On the 31st of July The Hindu reported the conversations between the Home and the Defence Ministries regarding delays in deployment. The news item is accessible at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3704749.ece Of particular interest is the letter written by the Home Ministry to the Defence Ministry pointing out the provisions of law that empower the district administration to seek the help of the armed forces for controlling and dispersing unlawful assemblies. I sought a copy of this communications between the Home and Defence Ministries on 03 August, 2012 (first attachment).
After my RTI application did the usual rounds of various desks in the Home Ministry the Central Public Information Officer of the Northeastern Division sent me a rejection letter in December 2012 merely citing Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act. This provision contains several grounds for rejection all of which are not relevant to the current case. So the CPIO’s reply was insubstantial. I filed a first appeal (second attachment) before the Joint Secretary in January, 2013. 38 days after filing the first appeal, the First Appellate Authority (FAA) has ordered disclosure of a part of the information after declassifying it. The FAA has sent me, free of charge, copies of the letters sent to the Defence Ministry and a fax sent to the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) about deployment of armed forces for conducting flag marches in the affected areas of Assam (third attachment).
The FAA has taken the correct step of declassifying the correspondence as the sensitivity it seeks to protect is no longer as acute as it was in August 2012. Such instances of good practice are rare in public authorities and must be commended. However the FAA has not sent me the detailed letter that the Home Ministry sent to the Defence Ministry recounting all the provisions ion law which empower the local administration to seek assistance of the locally stationed armed forces for dealing with communal violence. So a second appeal may have to be filed before the Central Information Commission.
Delay in the deployment of forces is becoming common practice:
What the correspondence reveals is that after the communal violence broke out the State Government wrote to the Home Ministry seeking urgent deployment of central armed forces. The dates are important. According to media reports major incidents of violence erupted on the 20th of July. The State Government wrote to the Home Ministry on 21st July. The order for deployment of armed forces went out to the DGMO by fax on 24th July at 9:22pm. There seems to be a gap of 3 days between the request for assistance and the orders issued for deployment.
Sections 130, 131 and 132 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 are crystal clear about the processes by which the local administration may request the assistance of the locally stationed armed forces for dispersing unlawful assemblies (in simple language – bloodthirsty mobs). Even an Executive Magistrate has the power to requisition the assistance of armed forces without waiting for orders from their superiors. The local head of the armed forces has a duty to assist the local administration to keep the peace under such circumstances. Under Section 131 even if no Executive Magistrate is contactable, any commissioned or gazetted officer of the armed forces may take prompt action on his own to disperse the mobs, arrest any person to punish him for violent actions or to prevent him from committing further violence. Such officers are granted immunity from criminal proceedings without the permission of the Central Government. None of these provisions seem to have worked in the violence affected areas of Assam.
In 2002 when communal violence broke out against muslims in Gujarat a similar controversy arose about the deployment of armed forces to stem the violence. A similar 3-day delay in the deployment of armed forces in the violence affected parts of Gujarat was noticeable then as well. Human Rights Watch’s report places the blame on the State Government (see: “We Have No orders to Save You- State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat” accessible at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/India0402-03.htm).
In the 2012 violence, the Government of Assam seems to have sought help within 24 hours of the outbreak of violence. RTI activists in Assam might like to find out whether the administration in the affected districts sent requests for help to locally stationed armed forces? If they did and assistance was not forthcoming immediately should not the responsible persons be held accountable?
What does it take to ensure quick action to stem communal violence? Should we hold classes on the provisions of the Cr.P.C for the armed forces and the district administration every year? Every police station that has communally sensitive areas is required to prepare and regularly rehearse a riot scheme. The riot scheme itself is a confidential document inaccessible to the public. It contains the drill and advice for taking action when communal violence erupts. How often are these drills conducted? In view of the massive loss of life and property riot schemes seem to have failed to protect lives and property in all the affected police station areas. Should the National Human Rights Commission not probe the reasons for delay in the deployment of the armed forces in addition to its probe into the management of relief and rehabilitation programmes? If the National Commission for Minorities and the National Commission for Scheduled tribes are also seized of this case, they could also probe this angle.
Narratives of the 2012 communal violence in Assam available online clearly document all the early warning signals that could have been used to take preventive action. More than 70 lives were lost and several hundred thousand persons rendered homeless. Such incidents happen with sickening frequency despite the existence of procedures and systems for preventing violence. When will the authorities start taking timely action? Three days was too long a wait for the dead, the injured and the displaced.
Please circulate this email as widely as possible.
In order to access our previous email alerts on RTI and related issues please click on:
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65&Itemid=84 You will find the links at the top of this web page.
If you do not wish to receive these email alerts please send an email to this address indicating your refusal.
Thanking you,
Yours sincerely,
Venkatesh Nayak
Programme Coordinator
Access to Information Programme
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
B-117, First Floor, Sarvodaya Enclave
New Delhi- 110 017, INDIA
Tel: +91-11-43180215/ 43180201
Fax: +91-11-26864688
Skype: venkatesh.nayak@skype.com
Alternate Email: nayak.venkatesh@gmail.com
Website: www.humanrightsinitiative.org